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ABSTRACT
INCIDENCE OF TICKET TAXES AND FEES IN U.S. DOMESTIC AIR TRAVEL
by
Joakim Karlsson 
University of New Hampshire, September, 2006 
The United States is currently witnessing a vigorous debate on public funding of air 
transportation and the role of taxes and fees levied on airline tickets. Yet, there is remarkably little 
economic literature on taxation in the U.S. airline industry. Analysis of a large sample of tickets for 
travel in the continental United States shows that the effective tax rate has increased from 11% in 
1993 to 16% in 2005. While the tax structure and levels have changed over time, this increase is 
largely due to a historical decline.
The theory of tax incidence asserts that economic incidence is a function of price 
elasticity and market power and is independent of statutory incidence. The U.S. ticket tax 
structure is a mixed policy of ad valorem and unit taxes. Under perfect competition, the incidence 
of these two types of taxes is identical. The incidence is bounded by the two extremes of the tax 
burden being shifted entirely onto the producer or entirely on the consumer. Under imperfect 
competition, incidence of the unit tax and that of the ad valorem tax need not be identical and 
overshifting is possible.
Empirical analysis of variations in the ad valorem and unit taxes for United States 
domestic air travel during the 1994-1997 and 2002-2005 periods indicates that the burden of the 
ad valorem tax is shared by consumers and producers. For the same periods, there is weak 
evidence of overshifting of the unit tax. The empirical analysis is hindered by the multiplier effect 
of ad valorem taxes, the lack of simultaneous variation in the ad valorem tax rate and unit taxes, 
the functional relationship between the two types of taxes, and a number of political and 
institutional details inherent to the airline industry which are difficult to capture in an econometric 
model.
x
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INTRODUCTION
The study of taxation is motivated in part by what it is intended to accomplish and in part 
by its unintended consequences. Taxation is generally intended to achieve one or more of the 
following: (1) provide public goods; (2) reduce negative externalities; (3) redistribute income; and 
(4) stabilize macroeconomic fluctuations. In the specific case of air transportation, only the first 
two objectives usually apply. Indeed, the main objective of air transportation taxation today is to 
collect revenues to fund aviation infrastructure and security needs. The air transportation 
infrastructure in the United States and the European Union (EU) is largely self-funded by these 
taxes and fees. Consequently, this type of taxation is sometimes referred to as a “benefits tax”, as 
the payees receive certain benefits in the form of air transportation infrastructure and security 
services.
Taxes and fees added to tickets are the main form of air transportation taxation, at least 
in the U.S. Consequently, ticket taxes and fees are the focus of this discussion. This funding 
system needs to cover facility planning, maintenance of the existing infrastructure, capacity 
expansion, operational costs, safety improvements, mitigation of environmental impacts, and the 
provision of security services. Note that the regular use of public funds for environmental projects 
related to airports, such as noise mitigation, somewhat blurs the distinction between the use of 
taxes to raise revenue for infrastructure vs. the use of taxes to offset environmental externalities. 
Negative externalities associated with air transportation include noise, noxious emissions and 
water quality impacts. In the United States and the EU, the objective of reducing externalities 
through taxation currently ranks a distant second and is only a minor part of the existing national 
tax structures for air transportation. However, there are clear indications, especially in the EU, 
that future taxes are likely to be introduced to address environmental externalities.
1
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Several ongoing developments offer further motivation for the study of taxation in the 
airline industry. In the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is reviewing the 
federal funding system for aviation, as the Congressional mandate for the existing tax structure is 
set to expire in 2007 (FAA, 2005a, 2005b). The importance of this issue is evidenced by 
testimony provided by the FAA, the Air Transport Association (ATA), Airports Council 
International -  North America, the American Association of Airport Executives, the Air Carrier 
Association of America, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, the National Air 
Transportation Association, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, and the National Business 
Aviation Association (U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure, 2005). The reauthorization process is also shaping up as a battle between the air 
carrier industry and general/businesss aviation over their respective tax burdens (Meckler, 2006, 
June 1, p. A1). Finally, the political importance of the process has been amplified because it is 
coinciding with contentious contract negotiations between the FAA and its air traffic controllers 
(Barr, 2006, May 31, p. D4).
In the EU, several developments have increased the interest in aviation taxation issues. 
The Swedish government, for example, has included a controversial new ticket tax in its 2006 
budget proposal. This would add SEK 50-100 (appr. $7-$14) per ticket in order to account for the 
environmental impact of air transportation (Swedish Ministry of Finance, 2005). This amount 
represents 2% to 4% of the average base fare for intra-EU travel originating in Sweden 
(Yamanaka, Karlsson, and Odoni, 2005, p. 11). The tax is part of a “green tax shift” policy, and 
would be offset by cuts in broad-based taxes such as the income tax. There is also a proposal for 
an EU-wide fuel tax, which is supported by environmental groups (European Federation for 
Transport and Environment, 2005). Finally, an ambitious proposal issued jointly by France, 
Germany, Spain, Brazil, and Chile calls for “a domestically applied and internationally coordinated 
levy on air transport travels” in order to combat global hunger and poverty in support of the United 
Nations Millennium Development Goals (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005; Doland, 2005, 
August 29). This proposal has now been approved by several countries (Schroeder, 2006, p. 3).
2
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The recent financial crisis of much of the airline industry adds another dimension to the
question of taxation. The industry has developed a seemingly unstable pattern of profit and loss
cycles, with losses outweighing profits (Hansman, 2005). This has forced the airlines to focus on
the extent to which taxes and fees affect their net revenues. At the same time, fares have been
declining. This is due to increased competition, especially from low-cost carriers, and due to the
erosion of high value business fares. As a whole, this has resulted in taxes and fees becoming a
larger proportion of the total ticket price (Karlsson, Odoni, and Yamanaka, 2004, pp. 291-292).
This trend has caused the industry to voice increasing concern over ticket taxes and fees,
leading to the following strongly worded joint statement by the ATA and the Association of
European Airlines (2005):
Aviation taxes and fees have outpaced inflation and fares, and the taxes and 
fees on an airline ticket purchased either in Europe or the U.S. are higher 
percentage-wise than the so-called ‘sin-taxes’ on things like alcohol and tobacco.
This tax and fee burden threatens the very fiber of the air transportation industry 
and the economies that rely on it.
It is likely that the growing share of the total ticket price that is made up by taxes and fees has
also increased passengers’ sensitivity to air transportation taxation. However, it should be kept in
mind that the airlines and their passengers receive air traffic control, airport infrastructure, and
security services through the payment of these taxes.
The introduction of any tax has unintended consequences for both consumers and
producers. When a tax is added to a ticket, the price of air travel for the consumer is generally
increased and, therefore, passengers change their economic decisions. This distortion of the
market creates a loss of consumer welfare which may be greater than the tax revenues collected,
even when taking into account the value of any benefits provided in return. This potential
deadweight loss is inherent in all practical forms of taxation. This excess burden is an important
measure when comparing alternative forms of taxation or determining whether the benefits of a
specific project outweigh the revenue collected to fund it. A detailed discussion of the efficiency of
various tax structures is beyond the scope of this study, but must be part of any comprehensive
tax policy debate.
3
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The focus of this research effort is the question of tax incidence. When a government 
assesses a ticket tax to collect revenue to fund its aviation system, it leaves unanswered the 
question of whether the producer or the consumer carries the economic burden. The answer 
depends on the economics of the air transportation market under consideration and not on the 
intent of the government entity that imposed the tax.
The goal of this study is to review the theory of tax incidence as it applies to air 
transportation and, to the extent possible, provide empirical measurements of the tax shifting. 
This study is motivated by the ongoing debate on the funding of air transportation, as well as the 
general lack of data on the impact of ticket taxes in the U.S., especially in regards to tax 
incidence.
4
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CHAPTER I
DESCRIPTION OF U.S. TICKET TAXES AND FEES
Ticket Taxes and Fees in the United States
Four types of taxes and fees are currently levied on domestic air fares in the United 
States: the federal ticket tax (FTT), the federal flight segment tax (FST), the passenger facility 
charge (PFC), and the federal security service fee (FSSF). Table 1.1 shows the history of 
changes in these taxes and fees. Note that Table 1.1 only shows enacted changes which last for 
at least one federal fiscal year. Temporary changes such as the lapse of federal authority to 
collect taxes in 1996 and the federal security fee holiday of 2003 are not shown. These are 
addressed separately in Chapter IV (see, for example, Figures 4.1 and 4.2).
Federal Ticket and Segment Taxes
Since the FTT and FST are essentially two components of one tax, they are described 
together. The FTT and the FST are paid into the Airport and Airway Trust Fund. This fund 
finances congressional appropriations to cover “those obligations of the United States...which are 
attributable to planning, research and development, construction, or operation and maintenance 
of air traffic control, air navigation, communications, or supporting services for the airway system” 
(Internal Revenue Code, 1986). Together, they accounted for $6.4 billion in 2004 (or 66% of the 
total revenue of the Airport and Airway Trust Fund), supporting FAA operations, facilities and 
equipment, and federal grants-in-aid for airports (U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, 2005). The federal ticket tax is currently equal to 7.5% of the 
base fare (the total fare less any taxes and fees). The segment tax, which is inflation adjusted, is 
currently equal to $3.30 (ATA, 2005).
5
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Table 1.1: Changes in domestic ticket taxes and fees in the U.S. (1941-2006)
Year FTT (rate) FST PFC (max.) FSSF
1941 5.0% - - -
1942 10.0% - - -
1943 15.0% - - -
1955 10.0% - - -
1956 5.0% - - -
1970 8.0% - - -
1980 5.0% - - -
1982 8.0% - - -
1990 10.0% - - -
1992 10.0% - $3.00 -
1997 9.0% $1.00 $3.00 -
1998 8.0% $2.00 $3.00 -
1999 7.5% $2.25 $3.00 -
2000 7.5% $2.50 $3.00 -
2001 7.5% $2.75 $4.50 -
2002 7.5% $3.00 $4.50 $2.50
2003 7.5% $3.00 $4.50 $2.50
2004 7.5% $3.10 $4.50 $2.50
2005 7.5% $3.20 $4.50 $2.50
2006 7.5% $3.30 $4.50 $2.50
Note: A dash (-) indicates the tax or fee was not applicable. Years with no changes in the tax and 
fee structure, rates, or levels are not shown.
The federal segment tax did not exist prior to October 1,1997 (ATA, 2005). Domestic air 
travel was taxed at a flat rate, which peaked at 10% during the period 1990-1996. The federal 
ticket tax rate was gradually reduced to 7.5% by 1999, in conjunction with an increase of the 
segment tax from $1 in 1997 to $3 by 2002 (inflation adjusted to $3.30 by 2006). The change 
from a flat 10% ticket tax was initiated in part by a coalition of seven large airlines, “motivated by 
their belief that the current system unfairly subsidize^] their low-fare competitors” (General 
Accounting Office, 1996b, p. 4). The adopted system resulted in the 7.5% ad valorem tax and the 
inflation adjusted segment tax. This differs in several regards from the airline coalition’s own 
proposal, but had the desired effect of increasing taxes for inexpensive tickets. For example, a 
round-trip ticket with a $100 base fare would have incurred a $10 federal tax in 1996, compared 
to a minimum of $14.10 in 2006, plus up to $10 in security fees and $18 in passenger facility
6
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charges. Conversely, a round-trip ticket with a $2,000 base fare would have incurred a $200 
federal tax in 1996, compared to a maximum of $191.20 in total taxes and fees in 2006 
(assuming one connection in each direction).
The Passenger Facility Charge
The PFC was instituted as a means of assisting airports with air carrier service to 
“finance eligible airport-related projects, including making payments for debt service” (AIR-21, 
2000). When the collection of PFCs began after June 1,1992, airports could apply to the FAA to 
collect $1, $2, or $3 per enplanement. Effective April 1, 2001, higher PFC levels up to $4.50 were 
introduced for certain airports (AIR-21, 2000; ATA, 2006b). PFCs are only collected for up to two 
boardings per each one-way trip, resulting in a maximum collection of $18 per round-trip (AIR-21, 
2000). PFCs are charged by airlines at the time a ticket is purchased and are then transferred 
directly to the appropriate airport(s).
The Federal Security Service Fee
The federal security service fee is the most recently adopted tax on U.S. domestic airline 
tickets. It was created by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (2001), with collection 
beginning February 1, 2002. It consists of a $2.50 tax per enplanement, limited to a maximum of 
two segments in each direction (i.e., a maximum of $10 for a round-trip ticket). The U.S.
Congress temporarily suspended the fee from June 1 to September 30, 2003 in order to provide 
war-time relief to the airline industry (ATA, 2006e).
Other U.S. Air Transportation Taxes
A number of other federal infrastructure and security taxes and fees are assessed on air 
carriers. These fall outside the scope of this study, as they apply only to international travel or are 
not directly added to the price of an airline ticket. Additionally, foreign nations impose taxes and 
fees on U.S. carriers engaged in international operations. These can be numerous and varied, 
but do not apply to U.S. domestic travel and are not covered here. Finally, air carriers also pay 
other infrastructure-related charges such as landing fees and airport leases, but these are not 
added directly to the price of tickets and also fall outside the scope of this study.
7
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Classification of Ticket Taxes and Fees
It is useful to place aviation taxes within a general classification of different types of taxes. 
The following classification scheme largely follows that defined by James and Nobes (1999).
Taxes vs. Fees
The terms “taxes” and “fees” are often used interchangeably. A tax is defined as “a 
compulsory levy made by public authorities for which nothing is received directly in return”
(James and Nobes, 1999). Examples of pure taxes exist in aviation: Denmark levies a general- 
purpose transportation tax, which will, however, be phased out by 2007 (Mandsberg, 2005). The 
new “green shift tax” proposed by the Swedish government could also be classified as a tax, 
although it is motivated by environmental policy. However, it can be argued that most ticket taxes 
should rightly be referred to as “fees” or a “benefits tax”, since infrastructure and services are 
provided in return. PFCs, in particular, are specific to individual airports and each airport must 
apply individually to the FAA for authority to use the revenues for one or more clearly identified 
projects (General Accounting Office, 1999, p. 4).
The Internal Revenue Service uses the term “excise taxes” instead of fees (2005). Mixing 
the terms “tax” and “fee” is justified by the general difficulty in accounting for the connection 
between a specific fee and the services provided in exchange. For example, the federal segment 
and ticket taxes are used to fund airport improvements and the operations of the FAA. However, 
they are first combined into the Airport and Airway Trust Fund and then disbursed through the 
federal appropriations process. Also, the FAA allows for considerable cross-subsidies between 
various segments of aviation. Consequently, it is not at all clear that each dollar levied on an 
airline ticket directly benefits the airline industry and its passengers. At the time of writing, the 
airline industry is calling for reductions in its tax burden, based in part on its view that it is 
subsidizing business aviation (Meckler, 2006, June 1, p. A1).
8
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The difficulty in separating taxes and fees is described in the following language from the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) manual on classifying taxes 
(OECD, 2004):
In the OECD classification the term “taxes” is confined to compulsory, unrequited 
payments to general government. Taxes are unrequited in the sense that 
benefits provided by government to taxpayers are not normally in proportion to 
their payments... Apart from vehicle license fees, which are universally regarded 
as taxes, it is not easy to distinguish between those fees and user charges which 
are to be treated as taxes and those which are not, since, whilst a fee or charge 
is levied in connection with a specific service or activity, the strength of the link 
between the fee and the service provided may vary considerably, as may the 
relation between the amount of the fee and the cost of providing the service.
Where the recipient of a service pays a fee clearly related to the cost of providing 
the service, the levy may be regarded as requited and...would not be considered 
as a tax.
The pragmatic solution is to recognize the theoretical distinction between taxes and fees, while in 
practice admitting that the difference is not always clear. For the remainder of this study, the 
collective term “taxes and fees” is generally used without further specification. The tax incidence 
will be identical, as long as airlines cannot reduce the imposition of fees by demanding fewer 
government services.
Direct vs. Indirect
Ticket taxes and fees are considered indirect taxes in that they are not paid directly by 
the passenger to the treasury, but rather are collected by the airline in question. All four U.S. 
ticket taxes and fees are collected by the airlines (or their agents) at the time of purchase. 
Outside the U.S., for instance in some Latin American nations, there are examples where 
passengers pay the tax directly at the airport.
Unit vs. Ad Valorem
A unit (or “specific”) ticket tax is a fixed monetary amount assessed to each ticket or 
segment. An ad valorem ticket tax consists of a fixed percentage rate applied to the base fare. 
Both types are assessed on airline tickets in the U.S. The federal ticket tax is a 7.5% ad valorem 
tax. The other three U.S. ticket taxes and fees on domestic air travel are all unit taxes.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Progressive vs. Regressive
Progressive taxes are those which “take an increasing proportion of income as the 
income rises” (James and Nobes, 1999). Regressive taxes have the opposite effect: Their 
proportion of income declines as income rises. The use of unit taxes and fees on airline tickets 
generally results in effective tax rates that decline as the total fare increases (although the 
effective tax rate also depends on the number of connections). However, without formally 
establishing a link between ticket prices and income it cannot be conclusively demonstrated that 
airline ticket taxes are regressive.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has established that federal excise taxes are 
generally regressive. In 2000, total excise taxes constituted 2.2% of the bottom quintile of 
household income, but only 0.6% of the highest quintile (CBO, 2003, p. 25). Though the CBO 
includes federal aviation taxes in its analysis, these represent a small portion of federal excise 
taxes. For example, federal excise taxes on tobacco and alcohol, which are known to be 
regressive, are double those collected on air travel (The Tax Foundation, 2006).
The regressive nature of a tax does not depend on the type of tax, but rather on the type 
of good being taxed. Also, there is evidence that excise taxes are less regressive than normally 
thought, when considering the lifetime burden instead of any single year of income (Poterba,
1989, pp. 325-326). While it is not the goal of this study to conclusively demonstrate that ticket 
taxes and fees are regressive, there is compelling evidence that air travel is not a luxury good 
(Adrangi and Raffiee, 2000, p. 493). The income elasticity of demand is estimated around unity 
(Gillen, Morrison, and Stewart, 2002; Adrangi and Raffiee, 2000). If income and fares scale 
proportionately, this would suggest that ticket taxes are in fact regressive, since the use of unit 
taxes in the U.S. ticket tax structure places a higher proportional burden on low fares. A mitigating 
factor is that the benefits received by each passenger are essentially independent of the base 
fare. Consequently, the benefits themselves may be regressive, as passengers largely receive 
the same air traffic control, airport, and security services whether they buy high or low fare tickets.
10
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CHAPTER II
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: THE EFFECTIVE TAX RATE
A convenient measure of the relative magnitude of airline ticket taxes is the effective tax 
rate (ETR), i.e., the proportion of taxes and fees relative to the base fare. The total fare for a 
domestic air trip consists of the sum of two parts: the base fare, BF, which is the total fare less 
any applicable taxes and fees, and the total taxes and fees, TTF, which is the sum of the four 
ticket taxes and fees described in Chapter I:
TTF = FTT + FST + FSSF + PFC (1)
For any sample of tickets, the effective tax rate is defined as:
E l * - 4^  (2,
e (b f )
where E(TTF) and E(BF) represent the average values of TTF and BF, respectively, weighted by 
the number of passengers.
Note that there is no convention in the airline industry as to whether tax rates should be 
computed on the basis of the producer price (i.e., the base fare) or the consumer price (i.e., the 
total fare). In this study, all tax rates are computed relative to the base fare per Equation 2. This is 
similar to the treatment of common consumer taxes such as sales taxes, lodging taxes, and 
meals taxes. It is also consistent with how the 7.5% federal ticket tax is computed. As shown 
below, airline industry statements regarding the effective tax rate are sometimes made with 
reference to the base fare and other times with reference to the total fare.
Prior to a research project initiated in 2003, of which this study is a continuation, 
practically no broad-based descriptive statistics of U.S. ticket tax rates were available. Numerous 
industry statements and news media accounts have reported that ticket taxes constitute 25% or 
more of an airline ticket. For example, Senator John McCain, Chairman of the Senate Committee 
on Commerce, Science and Transportation, has been quoted as saying that “taxes and fees 
already make up 26% of the total cost of an airline ticket” (Beavin and Looney, 2003, May).
11
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Former American Airlines CEO Robert Crandall has stated that “the multitude of fees and taxes
imposed now accounts for about 25% of the fare paid by the average traveler” (Crandall, 2002,
December 10). The same statistic was reported by the International Air Transport Association
(IATA) in a recent briefing on aviation taxes and charges: “taxes levied on [U.S.] aviation
exceeded US$ 14 billion in 2004, corresponding to 25% of a typical airfare” (IATA, 2005, p. 3).
Perhaps the most striking statement on the level of ticket taxes can be attributed to
Lawrence Lindsey, former Assistant to the President for Economic Policy and Director of the
National Economic Council (Lindsey, 2003, April 1, p. A14):
Federal taxes and fees now consume 25% of the cost of a low-priced ticket. That 
does not include the further tax burden on profits and wages that most 
businesses face. This tax compares with an 18% federal excise tax on cigarettes 
and an 11% federal excise tax on whiskey. Is air travel more of a sin than alcohol 
or tobacco?
Lawrence Lindsey artfully makes his reference to a “low-priced ticket”. This is an important 
distinction, because the 25% statistic is not based on a representative sample of airline tickets. 
Instead, it is derived by computing tax examples using what are purported to be typical tickets. 
However, these tickets do not necessarily correspond to average itineraries and prices. If, for 
example, the selected fare is lower than the mean for U.S. air travel, the resulting tax rate will 
appear higher than the actual average. This is because of the presence of unit taxes in the ticket 
tax structure.
The only known statistical analysis of ticket tax rates outside of this research effort is a 
report by Morrison and Winston (2003) completed on behalf of the National Business Travel 
Association. It uses a large sample of ticket data to compute average fare and tax rates, but is 
limited to business travelers in 3,200 markets. The results of that study indicate a tax rate of 8% 
in 1989 and 14% in 2002 (Morrison and Winston, 2003, p. 4).
This thesis is a continuation of a research project which estimated historical ETR values 
using itinerary and fare information from a 10% sample of all tickets (referred to as Data Bank 1A 
or DB1 A) for air travel within the continental U.S. (Karlsson, Odoni, and Yamanaka, 2004; 
Yamanaka, Karlsson, and Odoni, 2005). A summary of these results follows below.
12
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Overall Effective Tax Rate
Data from the second quarters of 1993, 2002, and 2004 shows that the average ETR on 
round-trip tickets was 10.9%, 15.9%, and 16.5%, respectively. These results are shown in 
Table 2.1, which also shows inflation adjusted average fares, taxes, and fees. Although the tax 
rate appears to be increasing over time, the absolute amount of taxes and fees has decreased 
slightly when expressed in constant dollars. The principal cause of the apparent increase in the 
tax rate increase is the significant decrease in average base fare, which declined by $175 or 40% 
between 1993 and 2004. In 2004Q2, the federal ticket tax, the only ad valorem tax for domestic 
air travel in the U.S., accounted for just under half the average total taxes and fees.
































1993Q2 2,164,162 $444.89 $48.40 $44.49 $0.00 $3.91 $0.00 10.9%
2002Q2 3,559,912 $291.74 $46.26 $21.88 $8.35 $9.07 $6.96 15.9%
2004Q2 3,893,783 $268.29 $44.25 $20.12 $8.06 $9.58 $6.50 16.5%
Note: Expressed in 2004 dollars; includes round-trip tickets only.
Distributive Aspects of the Effective Tax Rate
The three unit taxes and fees (i.e., FST, PFC, and FSSF) vary only with the passenger’s 
itinerary, irrespective of the base fare. Consequently, the average ETR decreases as the base 
fare increases, as shown in Figure 2.1. The least expensive tickets, i.e., those with a base fare of 
$200 or less, have an ETR greater than 20% (Yamanaka, Karlsson, and Odoni, 2005, p. 4). 
Roughly 50% of all domestic tickets in 2004Q2 had a base fare of less than $200, which may help 
explain the widespread impression that taxes and fees on airline tickets are excessively high. In 
sharp contrast, ETR varied only slightly with base fare in 1993, ranging from 11.9% for base fares 
less than $100 to 10.1% for base fares greater than $2,000. For base fares greater than $800, 
the ETR in 2004 and 2002 was under 10%, or lower than in 1993.
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Base Fare
The 2004Q2 data indicates that the average base fare for a low-cost carrier (LCC) was 
about $185, compared to about $305 for a legacy carrier (see Table 2.2). The legacy carriers in 
this analysis were American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, United, and US Airways; the low-cost 
carriers were ATA, jetBlue, and Southwest. However, the ETR for the LCCs was only three 
percentage points higher than the ETR for legacy carriers. Consequently, the impact of taxes and 
fees on LCC tickets is smaller than one might expect.
The main reason for this finding is that the average number of segments in a round-trip 
LCC itinerary is 2.25, as opposed to 2.58 for legacy carriers. Also, LCC routes often bypass the 
most congested airports in favor of secondary ones. As the most congested airports are also the 
ones that tend to impose passenger facility charges (and at higher levels), the average PFC paid 
by LCC passengers is considerably smaller. Because of these two effects, the FST, PFC and 
FSSF costs are smaller, on average, for low-cost carrier passengers than those of legacy carriers.
Average ETR = 16.1%
T
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LCC $185.91 $34.37 $13.94 $6.99 $7.81 $5.63 18.50%
Legacy $305.33 $47.00 $22.90 $7.99 $9.66 $6.45 15.40%
Note: Includes round-trip tickets only.
Perhaps surprisingly, ETR varies little with the distance between the origin and 
destination in each itinerary. One of the reasons is that the average base fare increases less than 
linearly with the origin-destination distance. For example, the average base fare for a distance of 
between 1,000 and 2,000 miles is only about 35% greater than for a distance of less than 200 
miles in the 2004 sample. A second reason is that longer distances are more likely to be 
associated with itineraries that include a connection at an intermediate airport. This, in turn, 
means a greater likelihood of a high FST, FSSF, and PFC.
Comparison with the European Union
A comparison of U.S. effective tax rates with results from the European Union (EU) is 
instructive to place U.S. tax rates in context. One challenge is that there is no public database in 
the EU equivalent to that made available by the U.S. Department of Transportation. A data set 
provided by the global travel distribution system provider Amadeus, S.A. was used to calculate 
ETR values for intra-EU travel in fifteen nations (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom). This sample consists of complete ticketing records for fifteen days selected 
from the period January 2004 to February 2005. It should be noted, however, that the data set 
omits most charter and low-cost carriers operating in the EU. The results, expressed in U.S. 
dollars, are summarized in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Average effective tax rate (15 day EU sample)
Ticket
category










All 3,032,209 $272.27 $44.19 $12.26 11.2%
One-Way 691,841 $166.74 $19.12 $4.50 8.5%
Round-trip 2,340,368 $303.47 $51.60 $14.56 11.6%
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EU tickets frequently include two tax codes, YQ and YR (here collectively referred to as 
YQYR), which are reserved for airline surcharges. To the uninformed consumer, YQYR charges 
may be indistinguishable from the true taxes and fees that appear on a ticket. In fact, in most 
cases these charges represent additional revenues for the airlines, primarily in the form of fuel 
surcharges. This raises a consumer information question as to the passengers’ ability to compare 
fares, as these charges are often not advertised. Indeed, the EU transport commissioner has 
proposed that airlines be forced to “publicize full fares, including taxes, charges and booking and 
credit card fees on their websites and in adverts” (Gow, 2006, July 18). In the analysis presented 
here, the YQYR charges are added to the base fare, and are excluded from the total taxes and 
fees. Consequently, Equation 2 is modified as follows for the EU analysis:
E T R = m m z i r n m .  (3)
E(BF) + E(YQYR)
The total amount of YQYR charges observed in the EU ticket sample consists of 27.8% of the 
sum of all of taxes and fees, and thus significantly affects ETR estimates.
If YQYR instead were treated as part of the total taxes and fees, the overall effective tax 
rate would change from 11.2% to 16.2%. There is no legitimate justification in treating YQYR as 
part of the taxes and fees, but this “apparent ETR” may be a better indicator of how the size of 
taxes and fees is perceived by air transportation consumers. Remarkably, the average YQYR 
charged to intra-EU tickets appears to have more than doubled over the sample period, from an 
average of $8 per ticket in January 2004 to just below $20 by February 2005.
The aggregate results, as presented above, mask the fact that there is great variability in 
ETR across individual EU nations. This is demonstrated in Table 2.4, which shows that ETR 
ranges from a high of 20.4% for travel originating in the United Kingdom to a low of 6.3% for 
Luxembourg. Note that a high tax rate can result from either high taxes or from low fares.
One major difference between the U.S. and the EU is that U.S. ticket taxes fund air traffic 
control, while EU taxes generally do not. Instead, carriers operating in EU airspace are billed 
directly by the various providers of air traffic control services, such as Eurocontrol. Any 
comparison of ETR values between the U.S. and the EU must take this difference into
16
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consideration, as air traffic control costs are substantial on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Unfortunately, there is no European data collection mechanism comparable to the U.S. carriers' 
monthly filings, which can readily identify the amounts paid by individual airlines for international 
air traffic control services.
Table 2.4: Effective tax rate by origin country (15 day EU sample)
Origin Country











United Kingdom 277,268 $191.01 $56.18 $14.30 20.4%
Greece 25,550 $199.57 $46.59 $9.68 17.6%
Denmark 81,951 $282.24 $72.88 $21.25 17.0%
Ireland 10,881 $206.17 $44.73 $13.01 14.5%
Finland 117,728 $301.65 $58.24 $12.78 14.5%
Sweden 138,691 $297.38 $66.89 $21.71 14.2%
The Netherlands 30,690 $364.76 $62.42 $12.62 13.2%
Belgium 39,683 $349.26 $57.26 $12.26 12.4%
Austria 43,020 $394.44 $76.47 $26.57 11.9%
France 616,651 $329.57 $56.06 $15.47 11.8%
Portugal 20,850 $263.84 $33.82 $4.47 10.9%
Germany 537,799 $343.90 $59.91 $22.15 10.3%
Italy 127,859 $289.88 $39.77 $13.51 8.7%
Spain 953,583 $198.06 $14.81 $1.15 6.9%
Luxembourg 10,005 $375.77 $44.10 $19.16 6.3%
Using supplemental data collected from two European airlines, Lufthansa and SAS 
Group, indicates that air traffic control costs would add roughly 7% to the effective tax rate. Both 
Lufthansa and SAS have flights throughout the EU and are based in countries where the effective 
tax rate is close to the EU-15 average of 11.2% (with the exception of Denmark). This suggests 
the conjecture that the effective tax rate in the EU would be approximately 18-19% with air traffic 
control costs taken into account. This would be slightly higher than the 2004Q2 value of 16.1% for 
U.S. domestic air travel. However, this is a very preliminary estimate, which serves primarily as a 
good launching point for future investigation. For example, this comparison does not take into 
account that a portion of U.S. air traffic control costs are subsidized by general tax revenues. 
Another substantial limitation is that the EU data set excludes practically all charter and low-cost 
carriers.
17
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CHAPTER III
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Who carries the burden of the ticket taxes and fees -  the passengers or the airlines?
That is the question of tax incidence. The purpose of this discussion is to present the economic 
theory of tax incidence as applied to air transportation. The theoretical approach to compute 
incidence is limited, which supports an empirical approach. However, the theory places bounds 
on the empirical computations of incidence. Under perfect competition, incidence is bounded by 
zero (i.e., full shifting onto the producer) and one (i.e., full shifting onto the consumer). Further, 
the incidence of a unit tax and an ad valorem tax are identical. Under imperfect competition and 
pure monopoly, overshifting is a possibility, so that the incidence can exceed one, and it is also 
possible for the incidence of the unit tax to be greater than that of the ad valorem tax.
Statutory vs. Economic Incidence
When discussing the burden of taxation, a distinction must be made between statutory 
and economic incidence. The statutory incidence of ticket taxes defines who is legally obligated to 
collect the tax and pay it to the treasury. In the U.S., the statutory incidence is clearly on the 
airline industry (AIR-21, 2000; Aviation and Transportation Security Act, 2001; Internal Revenue 
Code, 1986). However, statutory incidence is not the same as economic incidence, which 
determines who ultimately bears the burden of the tax (Fullerton and Rogers, 1993, p. 1). 
Statutory and economic incidence are independent and the general recommendation is that the 
statutory burden be structured so as to minimize tax collection costs. This concept of tax 
incidence equivalence applies to both unit and ad valorem taxes, is independent of the market 
structure, and is supported by experimental evidence (Ruffle, 2005).
18
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
There is often public confusion between statutory and economic incidence. For example, 
in response to an administration proposal to increase the federal security fee, the Administrator of 
the Transportation Security Administration, Kip Hawley, stated that “at the end of the day the 
money has to come from somewhere...our sense is that it’s fair to have that part of it come from 
the air passenger” (Faler, 2006, March 1, para. 23). This seems to imply a belief that an increase 
in the security fee would be entirely absorbed by the passengers.
Statutory incidence can affect economic incidence under certain assumptions. One 
example is imperfect or asymmetric information: Consider the payment of a hypothetical 
departure tax which must be paid in cash by the passenger at the airport at the time of departure: 
This tax may be unanticipated by the passenger. In this situation, it is possible that the 
passenger’s purchasing decision would have been different if the information available to the 
passenger and the airline had been identical. For the purpose of notation, this study places the 
statutory incidence on the airlines, which reflects U.S. and EU practices. The possibility of 
imperfect or asymmetric information between airlines and passengers in regards to ticket taxes 
and fees is not explored.
General vs. Partial Equilibrium
A simplifying assumption of this study is that the airline industry is treated independently 
of the rest of the economy: All other markets are ignored. Such a partial equilibrium analysis may 
lead to incomplete results, especially when the market under consideration is large relative to the 
overall economy (Rosen, 2005, p. 292). Historically, passenger revenues for U.S. airlines have 
hovered around 1% of total gross domestic product, although this has dropped to 0.7-0.75% 
since the events of September 11, 2001 (Hansman, 2005).
There are several drawbacks to considering only a partial equilibrium framework. A tax 
applied to the airline industry affects not only the price of air travel, but also the price of other 
goods, as air travelers and airlines adjust their consumption in response to the tax. It should be 
noted that economists consider the tax burden to be carried exclusively by individuals, not firms 
(Rosen, 2005, p. 274; Gruber, 2005): Thus, the notion of airlines carrying a portion of the tax
19
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burden actually describes the burden carried by individual airline employees and investors. This 
distinction becomes increasingly important when considering the impact of air transportation 
taxes on other markets. For the sake of simplicity, the term “airlines” is used throughout this study 
to refer to the portion of the burden not borne by passengers.
Some industries will benefit from increased taxation on the airline industry, and others will 
suffer. In turn, this affects the welfare of those who provide labor and capital to industries, which 
can alter the economic incidence. Consequently, using a broader general equilibrium model can 
produce outcomes which are not possible under partial equilibrium models (Fullerton and Metcalf, 
2002, p. 1790).
Partial equilibrium analyses ignore the spending of the tax revenues collected. This 
spending matters, as it can have distributional effects on relative prices (Fullerton and Metcalf, 
2002, pp. 1791-1792). There is a feedback mechanism involving public spending: When, for 
example, the FAA acquires a new radar system, it converts private goods such as labor, capital, 
and materials into a public good. Therefore, its consumption choices are affected by the relative 
prices of goods in the private markets, which in turn are affected by the raising of taxes (Keller, 
1980, pp. 8-10). This can be addressed through a balanced-budget incidence analysis, “which 
computes the combined effects of levying taxes and government spending financed by those 
taxes” (Rosen, 2005, p. 276). Partial equilibrium models also do not capture taxes on inputs such 
as labor and fuel. This has some bearing on the results, especially if changes in ticket taxes are 
linked to or coincide with changes to these input taxes.
General equilibrium models vary in complexity and analytical power. Relatively simple 
models, for example those considering two sectors using two inputs, capital and labor, can be 
solved analytically. They can therefore be used to generate results with considerable explanatory 
power. However, such models generally require a substantial number of simplifying assumptions 
that limit their value. For example, such models may only allow for incrementally small tax 
changes, may require specific assumptions regarding the production function, and may exclude 
dynamic effects or long term implications of changes in capital (Keller, 1980, pp. 2-6; Fullerton 
and Metcalf, 2002, pp. 1795-1800).
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The alternative approach is to use computational models that allow for much more 
complex models of the economy, which are then solved numerically. However, such models may 
not provide the explanatory power required to draw more general conclusions (Keller, 1980, p. 3). 
In practice, these models also require a large number of assumptions to be made in order to be 
able to arrive at a computable result. Given these limitations, a partial equilibrium analysis seems 
a reasonable starting point for analyzing tax incidence in the airline industry. A logical progression 
for future work would be a study of balanced-budget incidence.
Tax Incidence Under Perfect Competition
Under the assumption of perfect competition with flexible prices, tax incidence can be 
analytically derived. It can also be shown that the incidence of a unit tax is identical to that of an 
ad valorem tax, given that the latter is normalized to account for units of measurement and a 
multiplier effect inherent to ad valorem taxation.
Unit Tax
The derivation shown here generally follows Kotlikoff and Summers (1987). Consider the 
case of a unit tax, t . If t = 0 , there is no tax, and output and price are simultaneously 
determined by market clearing forces at some equilibrium price p * . After the application of the 
tax, the passenger faces the tax inclusive price p D and the supplier receives the tax exclusive 
price p s , such that:
p D = p s + t  (4)
Note that in an airline pricing example, p s is identical to the base fare (BF). It is also known as
the net price, whereas p D represents the total fare or gross price.
This framework assumes that the statutory incidence is placed on the supplier, as is the 
case in the U.S. airline industry. The results are identical if the tax is collected from the consumer 
and, effectively, it does not matter whether the tax is modeled as a shift in the demand curve or in 
the supply curve.
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The equilibrium price p* in the absence of a tax is defined by the demand function
D [ p D) and supply function s ( p s ), so that p [ p * )  = s(p*). The aftertax equilibrium is given by 
(Kotlikoff and Summers, 1987, p. 4 ):
d (p d ) = s (p d - t )  (5)
Differentiating Equation 5 with respect to t results in:
dD dpD dS f  dpD ^
dpD dt dp“ dt
- 1 (6)
Solving for the tax incidence, expressed as the pass-through burden on the consumer, yields:
(7)dt S '- D ' 
where S' = dS I dpD and D ' = dD Idps .
Noting d {p ° ) = s [p s) and dS / dps = dS / dpD , the result expressed by Equation 7 
can be restated in terms of the price elasticities of supply and demand:
dp D _  £ s
dt £S - £ °
where
,s _ dS p s
(8)
£  = — r —  (9)dps S
and
dD p 
dpD D£ ^  0 0 )
Note that for a downward sloping demand curve, D ' <  0 , so that £ °  <  0, whereas 
£ s > 0 . This places lower and upper bounds on tax incidence under perfect competition, so that:
0 < ^ < 1  (11) 
dt
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A value of zero means the tax is completely shifted onto the producer, whereas a value of one 
means the tax is shifted onto the consumer. One implication of these bounds is that there is no 
possibility of overshifting of taxes, under the assumption of perfect competition. Whichever party 
has a more inelastic response to price generally ends up carrying the tax burden. For example, if 
the demand curve is perfectly inelastic, the tax incidence under perfect competition is given by:
In this case, the tax burden falls entirely on the consumer.
Ad Valorem Tax
Consider a single ad valorem tax with an effective tax rate t . After the application of the 
tax, the passenger faces the tax inclusive price p D and the supplier receives the tax exclusive 
price p s , such that:
Under this framework, the incidence is obtained by evaluating dp D I  d r  , where d r  is the change 
in tax revenue resulting from a change in the ad valorem tax rate:
From Equations 13 and 14, it follows that the tax incidence of an ad valorem tax is given by:
measurement units, since incidence is defined as a change in price with respect to a tax level, not 
a tax rate. The second is that the incidence of an ad valorem tax includes a multiplier effect 
represented by the factor 1 + r  . “Ad valorem taxation has a distinctive multiplier effect: since part 
of any increase in the consumer price goes to the government as tax revenue”, whereas a unit 
tax “has no such effect: the producer price rises one-for-one with the consumer price” (Keen, 
1998, p. 5).
P°=P *(l + r) (13)
d r  = p sd r (14)
(15)
Two observations are in order: The first is that a factor of 1/ p D is required to adjust for
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The multiplier effect can be illustrated with a simple example. Consider a before tax price 
of $100 with an ad valorem tax rate of 10%. Assume that the tax rate is increased to 20% and 
that the consumer bears the full burden. In this case, the after tax price increases from $110 to
$120. With Ap D -  $10 and A t  = 0.1, the price effect is given by:
Ap D
=  $100 
A t
Dividing by p D = $120 to convert units results in:
\  Ap =  0.833 
p  A t




Full shifting onto the consumer implies that the producer price remains constant as the 
tax rate increases. The multiplier effect means that an increase in taxes collected from the 
producer results in an even higher increase in consumer price, since a portion of the increase 
goes to the government as additional ad valorem tax revenue (Delipalla and O’Donnell, 2001, 
p. 891). Note that for small T , Equation 17 is a reasonable approximation of the true incidence, 
but will always be biased downwards, as it excludes the multiplier effect.
Given a demand function d (p ° ) and a supply function s[ps), the after tax equilibrium 
is given by:
(19)
Differentiating Equation 19 with respect to T results in:
dpD
dD dpD _ dS 
dpD d t  dps
d r
(1 +  t )-
(20)
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Solving for dp D /  d r  results in:
rr/ DS p
d p D _  (1 + t ) 2
I TTf (21)
Normalizing by 1 /p D and applying the multiplier effect \  + r  results in the following expression
for the tax incidence:
S'
(22)
, the tax incidence of an ad
valorem tax can be expressed in terms of the price elasticities of demand and supply:
Comparing this result with Equation 8 demonstrates that under perfect competition, the tax 
incidence of a unit tax and that of an ad valorem tax are identical, and have the same testable 
implications. Specifically, the tax incidence of an ad valorem tax under perfect competition has a 
lower bound of zero and an upper bound of one.
Application of Theory to Air Transportation
Assuming for the moment that perfect competition is an applicable model, several 
difficulties arise in trying to apply Equations 8 or 23 to estimate tax incidence in the air 
transportation industry. The first is that price elasticities vary along several dimensions, including 
type of travel (i.e., leisure vs. business) and trip length (Gillen, Morrison, and Stewart, 2002). 
Second, short-run price elasticities are likely to differ from those in the long-run. One estimate, 
although out of date, is that the price elasticity of demand for air travel ranges from -0.1 in the 
short run to -2.4 in the long run (Gwartney and Stroup, 1997). On the supply side, short run 
behavior is expected to be inelastic, as airlines’ capital investments in aircraft and airport facilities
25
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cannot be changed quickly. Third, because the airline industry has undergone structural changes 
in recent years, including a multi-year demand shock caused by the events of September 11,
2001 (Ito and Lee, 2004), only the latest estimates of price elasticities should be used.
On the demand side, there are large numbers of agents acting as price takers and 
without consideration of the actions of other consumers, so that the demand curve is relatively 
clearly defined. On the supply side, the agents form a much smaller group, and are more likely to 
react to the behavior of competitors. These agents may exhibit various forms of price leadership 
and the notion of a supply curve may cease to exist. For this reason, there are large numbers of 
empirical assessments of price elasticity of demand, including several recent meta-studies, but 
practically no estimates of price elasticity of supply.
A MITRE Corporation study estimates that price elasticity of demand ranges from -0.56 
to -1.82, depending on distance (Bhadra, 2002). Two large meta-analyses have similar results: A 
study for the Canadian Department of Finance resulted in values ranging from -0.70 to -1.52 for 
domestic travel (Gillen, Morrison, and Stewart, 2002). Another meta-analysis of 204 studies found 
a mean elasticity of -1.15 with a standard deviation of 0.62 (Brons, Pels, Nijkamp, and Rietvald, 
2002). On the supply side, Ito and Lee report an implied price elasticity 0.74 (2004), estimated 
over a time period of several years. These values can be used to generate hypothetical tax 
incidence values, as shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Hypothetical values of tax incidence under perfect competition
e D = -0 .7 0  e D = -1 .15  e D = -1 .52
£ s = 0.74 0.51 0.39 0.33
The value of this analysis is quite limited given the required assumption of perfect 
competition, as well as the lack of empirical estimates of the price elasticity of supply. Under 
different assumptions regarding market power, the conclusions would change. This theoretical 
approach provides, at best, limited indications about incidence, which argues for empirical 
methods. However, these theoretical results represent are useful for comparison with the 
empirical results. They emphasize that incidence is bounded by zero and one. The range of
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values shown in Table 3.1 might be reasonable results of an empirical analysis. Different 
empirical results could indicate a market structure other than perfect competition.
Tax Incidence With Free Entry and Exit
In the discussion above, the number of firms is assumed to be fixed and exogenous. 
Under a long-run assumption that allows for free entry and exit of firms, the results change. For 
example, consider a simple model such as presented by Varian (1992, p. 220), with no entry or 
exit costs and with firms facing a uniform cost function c(y) .  If the number of firms is high, the
supply curve is flat, and is assumed to be defined by p s = p * . The equilibrium price p* is set 
by the zero-profit condition, which is the level of output where average cost equals marginal cost:
c(y)  dc
—  = —  (24)
y dy
In this case, supply is perfectly elastic, so that e s -  . Since all the assumptions
regarding perfect competition still hold, Equation 8 can be used to compute tax incidence, as long 
as the price elasticity of demand is assumed to be finite:
dp D £ s
- t r = — — d =1  (25>dt £ - £
Consequently, in this long term scenario, the tax burden falls entirely on the consumer: When a 
unit tax is increased, the price facing the consumer rises by exactly the amount of the tax.
Tax Incidence Under Pure Monopoly or Imperfect Competition
Unlike perfect competition, pure monopolies and imperfect competition allow for the 
possibility of overshifting (Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider, 2001, pp. 7-12), since prices are set 
above marginal cost (Delipalla and O’Donnell, 2001, p. 891). In the overshifting scenario, the total 
fare paid by the passenger after a tax increase is higher than the sum of the original fare and the 
tax increase. In some, but not all, cases of overshifting, a tax increase can result in higher profits. 
As shown above, overshifting cannot occur under perfect competition, but “once imperfectly
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competitive markets are allowed, overshifting becomes a possibility and can be guaranteed in 
some model specifications” (Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002, p. 1825).
Additionally, under imperfect competition the economic effects of an ad valorem tax can 
be different than those of a unit tax. For example, under certain assumptions, an ad valorem tax 
can lead to firms exiting the market, which reduces the burden on producers and increases the 
burden on consumers: “While a change in the excise tax does not affect the equilibrium number 
of firms, a change in the ad valorenn tax does... Ad valorem tax incidence can be decomposed 
into two components: a direct effect and an indirect effect through the change in the equilibrium 
number of firms” (Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002, p. 1831).
In industries with differentiated products, non-price competition opens up additional 
pathways in which taxes can manifest their impacts. For example, in addition to direct impacts on 
fare levels, changes in ticket taxes can affect product quality and variety: “Non-price competition 
can substantially affect the degree to which output taxes are passed forward to consumers and 
can lead to counterintuitive results” (Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002, p. 1832). It is therefore possible 
that the introduction of a new tax is entirely absorbed by the airlines, or even that fares go down 
after a tax hike, because of strategizing within an oligopoly of airlines.
Pure Monopoly
A pure monopoly scenario allows for a relatively straightforward theoretical analysis of tax 
incidence. For example, to demonstrate that overshifting can occur in a pure monopoly, consider 
a monopolist model with constant marginal cost and a downward sloping demand curve (see, for 
example, Varian, 1992, pp. 236-237). The profit maximization problem is stated as:
max p (y )y  - c y  (26)
y
If the firm now faces a unit tax, the profit maximization problem can be extended to account for 
the tax:
max p (y ) y  -  (c + t )y  (27)
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At the optimal choice of output y  , the first order condition becomes:
^  = p (y * )+y * p ' ( y * ) ~ {c + t )  = Q (28)dy
Note that the tax enters as a parameter to the optimal output, so that y * -  y ( f ) .
Equation 28 can readily be arranged in terms of the price elasticity of demand:
> ( / (
l  + £ D^
= c + t  (29)
The marginal cost and unit tax are both positive. Therefore, under the standard assumption of a
downward sloping demand curve, the condition e D < -1  must hold.
The chain rule is the starting point for deriving a theoretical expression for tax incidence 
in this example:
^  =  p ' { y ) ^  (30)
dt v  ' d t
Recognizing that d n l  dy is constant at zero from the first order condition (Equation 28), it 
follows from total differentiation that:
d 2n  , d 2n  , _




I r - i r -  <32)dt o n
d 2n
Note that the second order condition — -  < 0 is guaranteed by the sufficient conditions for the
dy2
existence of a maximum.
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From the profit function ni^y*) = p{y*  )y* -  (c + t )y*  it follows that
dy _  1
(33)
dt 2 p ' ( y * ) + y * p " ( y * )
Substituting Equation 33 into 30 and rearranging, results in the following expression for tax 
incidence:
dp _  1
dt 2 + y * p ' ( y * ) l  p \ y )  (34)
Since p ' ( y )  < 0 , it follows that overshifting is guaranteed under the following condition:
y ' > - 7 $ )  (35)
As an example, consider the demand function y -  app , which has a constant price 
elasticity of demand, so that:
£ D = P  (36)
In this case, the first order condition given by Equation 29 can be differentiated to obtain: 
dp e D P
dt \  + £ d 1 + P
(37)
As noted previously, the first order condition also implies that e D < -1 ,  from which it follows that:
£ > 1  (38)
dt
Consequently, a constant price elasticity demand function is one of several special cases which 
guarantee overshifting of taxes in a pure monopoly.
The monopolist charges a price which represents a mark-up over the marginal cost,
which can be shown to equal -  P I  s D , whereas in perfect competition, the price equals marginal
cost. It is this mark-up that allows for over-shifting. For example, if £ D = - 4 ,  and the price is 
$100, the mark-up is 25% and the marginal cost is $75. If the marginal cost increases by $15 
because of a new tax, the new price will be $120, which would represent overshifting by one-third 
of the tax increase.
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Note that this does not mean that the monopolist is better off after a tax increase. By the 
envelope rule, it follows that:
Therefore, in the vicinity of the maximum profit i t  , the monopolist’s profit decreases with a tax 
increase, as long as output is positive.
Oligopoly
Under theoretical constructs such as perfect competition and pure monopoly, analytical 
derivation of tax incidence is relatively straightforward. Oligopolies, however, include a range of 
possible strategic behaviors with varying consequences for the incidence question. These 
behaviors are usually modeled by selecting one of a few archetypical models of oligopolistic 
behavior. While real world markets are likely to exhibit aspects of several of these theoretical 
models of oligopolistic competition, the models are useful in deriving results that can be used to 
approximate actual behavior. These models can be broadly distinguished as non-cooperative or 
cooperative (i.e., cartel) models. Ruling out cartel behavior, two of the basic models include 
Cournot and Bertrand behavior. In the Cournot model, firms take as given the output of other 
firms, and then choose their output so as to maximize profits, whereas in the Bertrand model, the 
price of other firms is taken as given (Varian, 1992, pp. 285-292). Other non-cooperative models 
include models with a dominant firm acting either as a price or quantity leader (Varian, 1992, 
pp. 295-302). Another important distinction is whether or not the oligopoly in question is delivering 
a homogenous product, or whether there is non-price competition via differentiated products, 
which may apply to the airline industry.
Tax incidence can be analytically derived for some of these oligopoly models (see, for 
example, Hamilton, 1999 and Barron, Blanchard, and Umbeck, 2004). However, this requires 
knowing which model is applicable to the market under consideration. Empirical analysis 
demonstrates that imperfect competition exists in the airline industry, but that the evidence is 
inconclusive as to which specific model best applies (Fischer and Kamerschen, 2003, p. 91).
31
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
There is mixed support in the literature for both the Cournot and Bertrand models (Bilotkach, 
2004, pp. 8-10). This makes it difficult to proceed much further with a theoretical incidence 
discussion under imperfect competition, which strengthens the case for an empirical approach.
While there is considerable literature on the impact of unit taxes, analyses of the 
simultaneous application of both ad valorem and unit taxes are much less common, especially 
under imperfect competition. A seminal paper in this regard is that of Delipalla and O’Donnell 
(2001), which, in turn, is based on the theoretical framework of Delipalla and Keen (1992). The 
starting point of these papers is the after-tax profit for firm i  with output y t , in an industry 
consisting of n  firms with total output Y . Within this framework, the after-tax profit is given by:
It should be noted that this model has the statutory incidence placed on the consumer, so 
that the unit tax s and ad valorem rate v  relate to the producer and consumer prices as follows:
This differs from the airline industry, where the statutory incidence is placed on the producer. In 
this case, a joint policy with a unit tax t  and an ad valorem rate T result in a different relationship 
between the consumer and producer prices:
As noted previously, the economic implications are the same regardless of the framework. 
However, it is important to recognize that while the ad valorem rates T and v  are related, they 
are not identically defined. The same applies to the unit taxes t  and s . Specifically, comparing 
Equations 41 and 42 reveals that:
Tax Incidence Under the Dual Policy of Ad Valorem and Unit Taxes
(40)
p s =  ( l  - v ) p D - s (41)
p D =  ( l  +  r ) p s + t (42)
V =
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The price effects of each type of tax are related by market power through p , “the mark­
up of gross price over tax-inclusive marginal cost” (Delipalla and O’Donnell, 2001, p. 890), so 
that:
dp D
dt - M  (45)
1 dp
■(l + r )
p D d r
In perfect competition, p - 1, implying that the price effect of the two types of taxes do not differ. 
In imperfect competition, however, p  > 1, so that “the price effect of the specific tax exceeds that 
of the ad valorem by a proportion given by the value of the mark-up” (Delipalla and O’Donnell, 
2001, p. 891).
The mark-up is a function of price elasticity of demand and the strategic interaction 
between firms, so that:
P  = -------- —------- (46)
1 + ^ r r  
1=1 A
Here, characterizes the strategic interaction between firms:
HY
4 =  — e[ 0  ,n] (47)
dyt
where = 0 corresponds to “‘competitive’ in the sense that each firm takes industry output to 
be unaffected by its own input choice” (Delipalla and Keen, 1992, p. 353), = 1 corresponds to
a Cournot model, and = n to joint profit maximization (i.e., tacit collusion).
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CHAPTER IV
EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
As a result of the theoretical limitations outlined above, few of the findings regarding tax
incidence have been thoroughly tested (Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002, pp. 1822-1823):
In summary, few of the standard assumptions about tax incidence have been 
tested and confirmed... Most others have never been reliably tested... Many 
general equilibrium simulation studies “calculate” the incidence of each tax based 
on carefully-articulated theories, and many data-intensive studies use these 
results to “assume” the incidence of each tax. But competing theories are rarely 
tested, and so econometric estimation remains fertile ground for new research.
To the author’s best knowledge, there are no published econometric studies of tax incidence in
the airline industry. The econometric method described here is intended to be a starting point for
empirical research in this area.
Unfortunately, there is no natural experiment in which a sample of U.S. airline tickets
receives a tax policy treatment and a control group does not. Due to the general lack of ticket
level data in nations other than the U.S., it is not possible to mimic Delipalla and O’Donnell (2001)
by exploiting variations in taxes across different nations. Also, it should be emphasized that
Delipalla and O’Donnell study taxes on cigarettes, a relatively homogenous product. For air travel,
the most viable approach appears to be to model the change in price due to variations in taxes
across time and routes, while controlling for other exogenous factors that impact fares.
Model Specification
There are two basic choices in model specification: Using a structural form or a reduced 
form. The former requires modeling the demand and supply sides separately. The advantage of 
the structural form is its explanatory power of the underlying market dynamics. However, the 
structural form is subject to misspecification and identification problems. The reduced form 
specification is simpler to implement, provides a direct estimation of the price impact, but has less 
explanatory power. This study follows the approach of Delipalla and O’Donnell (2001), Aim, 
Sennoga, and Skidmore (2005), and others, by using a reduced form approach.
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The reduced form specification can be generalized as:
P = f(t,T,V,z) (48)
where V  and Z  are vectors of exogenous variables affecting supply and demand, respectively. 
These could include consumer preferences, factor costs, income, and other exogenous controls.
Functional Form
If the only variation is in the unit tax, a simple linear specification is perfectly adequate (or 
logarithmic, if the focus is on elasticities). Consider the approach adopted by Aim, Sennoga, and
Skidmore (2005), which explores the linear demand and supply functions p D = a - b y  and
p s - c  + dy ,  where the standard assumptions b >  0 and d >  0 apply.
Under these assumptions, the equilibrium after introducing a unit tax t with statutory 
incidence on the producer is given by:
p D = a - b y  = c + dy + t (49)
Solving results in:
D ad + b e +  bt
b + d
The tax incidence is then given by:
dp D _  b
(50)
(51)
dt b +  d
In this case, the incidence is constant. In a linear specification, the coefficient on the unit tax will 
be a direct estimate of the tax incidence.
Conversely, if the only variation is in the ad valorem tax, a strong argument exists for 
using a semilogarithmic specification (log-lin) for estimating the incidence (Besley and Rosen, 
1999, pp. 160-161). Consider a specification of the following general form:
In p D = /3t  + y V  + ujZ  + e (52)
where e is a stochastic error term and V  and Z  are exogenous supply and demand shifters.
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Differentiating this specification with respect to the ad valorem tax rate results in:
,53,
p  d r
Note that this estimate excludes the multiplier effect 1 + T , and is therefore biased downwards. 
For this reason, estimating the incidence of an ad valorem tax, such as the federal ticket tax, is 
more challenging than estimating the incidence of a unit tax. For small T , the multiplier effect is 
close to unity, in which case /? approximates the incidence of the ad valorem tax. A simple, but
imperfect, way to adjust for this bias is to multiply the estimated coefficient f t  by 1 + f , where f  
is the sample mean of the ad valorem tax rate.
To highlight the complexity of simultaneously modeling unit and ad valorem taxes, the 
case of perfect competition with linear demand and supply functions is extended to include both 
types of taxes. This results in the following expression for the consumer price at equilibrium:
p D = a -b y  = ( 1 + t ) ( c  + dy) + 1 (54)
Eliminating y and solving for p D results in:
D J l  + r)jad + bc) + bt (56)
b + d  ( l + T)
Differentiating Equation 55 with respect to the unit tax and the ad valorem tax rate, respectively, 
results in:
^  -  *  (56,
d t  b  +  d ( l  +  T )
d p D _  b { a d  +  b e -  d t ) (57)
d t  [b +  d { l  +  T ) f
These two expressions represent non-linear functions of T (and t , in the case of Equation 57).
The existing literature offers several practical options for specifying the empirical model. 
One approach is to convert the ad valorem tax to a specific tax by multiplying the ad valorem rate 
and the producer price. This is the method adopted by Chouinard and Perloff (2004) in their study 
of incidence of federal and state gasoline taxes. This approach potentially introduces endogeneity,
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as price is entered on both the left-hand and right-hand sides of the model specification. In the 
case of gasoline taxes, ad valorem taxes are only present in some states, and are small relative 
to the specific taxes. In the case of U.S. ticket taxes, however, ad valorem taxes constitute 
approximately half of the total tax burden. Consequently, this approach is rejected for this study.
Delipalla and O’Donnell use a reduced form estimation, and emphasize that their choice 
is driven by “the specification which best fits the data subject to the statistics properties assumed 
by the estimator being satisfied” (Delipalla and O’Donnell, 2001, p. 898). They employ a linear 
specification (lin-lin) for some countries and a logarithmic specification (log-log) for others. In 
same cases, they also introduce quadratic terms (Delipalla and O’Donnell, 2001, p. 899). While 
this approach adds flexibility, it creates a level of detachment between their theoretical framework 
and the empirical estimation. It is also difficult to deduce a specific rationale for any one of their 
specifications, other than optimizing the fit to the data.
To summarize, there is a trade-off in the choice of specification between a semilog and a 
linear (or fully logarithmic) form. The semilog specification provides a direct estimate of the tax 
incidence of the ad valorem tax, but misspecifies the estimation of the incidence of the unit tax. 
Conversely, the linear specification directly estimates the tax incidence of the unit tax, but 
misspecifies the estimation of the incidence of the ad valorem tax. In order to estimate the tax 
incidence of the ad valorem tax under a linear specification, the coefficient from the estimation 
must be evaluated at the sample means of the price and ad valorem tax rate, through application 
of Equation 15, which is also part of the method chosen by Delipalla and O’Donnell (2001, 
pp. 899, 903)
Primary Model
The empirical analysis uses quarterly fare and tax data for all origin-destination airport 
pairs in the continental United States. To simplify the analysis, Alaska and Hawaii are excluded, 
since the tax rules treat these markets as hybrids of domestic and international flights (ATA, 
2006e). The model is estimated both in the aggregate and for two pools of selected sub-markets, 
one pool of highly competitive markets and one pool of highly concentrated (i.e., dominated) 
markets.
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The aggregate estimation uses the semilogarithmic specification:
In p f  = /?0 + PxTt + P2 In tt + In ATACostIndext 
+ fi^LCCShare, + f i$0t + y  t + £ t
where the subscript t indicates the time period (i.e., quarter), p? is passenger weighted 
average tax-inclusive fare, r t is the ad valorem tax rate applied to the producer price, and tt is 
passenger weighted average of the sum of all unit taxes and fees. Two supply-side variables are 
included: ATACostIndext is an airline cost index compiled by the ATA. LCCSharet is the
share of total revenue passenger miles (RPM) generated by low-cost carriers (LCCs). Price 
response to the entry of LCCs is thought to have significantly altered the airline industry:
“Probably the most significant development in the U.S. airline industry during the past decade has 
been the continued expansion of Southwest and the resurgence of low-fare entry generally” 
(Transportation Research Board, 1999, p. 49). Due to the severe limit on available degrees of 
freedom caused by the low number of observations, a single time trend variable Qt is used in lieu
of year fixed effects. Quarter fixed effects are denoted by y t and et is a random error term.
There is no industry standard for which airlines are classified as low-cost carriers. 
Following the convention of other authors (e.g., Hansman, 2005; Ito and Lee, 2003) the following 
carriers are included: AirTran, America West, ATA, Frontier, JetBlue, Southwest, and ValuJet 
(merged with AirTran in 1997).
For the pools of sub-markets, the primary model is the semilogarithmic specification:
in r f  = A  + A *, + A  + &  In ATACostIndexl + M , ^
+ y,+Qj, + p t + e„
where the subscript i  represents a specific origin-destination route defined at the airport level.
Variables not already defined above include the following: uit is a route specific unemployment
rate derived from underlying state labor force data, which serves to represent all exogenous 
demand-side influences attributed to the general state of the economy. Year fixed effects are
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denoted by Q)t and route fixed effects are denoted by p r  Year fixed effects are used instead of
a single time trend variable, since more degrees of freedom are available and they can potentially 
identify effects unique to a specific year.
Alternate models using fully logarithmic and linear specifications are used to evaluate 
robustness to functional form. All variables are defined in more detail in Table 4.1, which also 
identifies the data sources used. The column labeled “Identifier” shows how the variable in 
question is named in the statistical programs used for estimation, as well as in the corresponding 
output tables.
Table 4.1: Definitions of variables
Variable Identifier Description and source
P ° PorTF
Total fare including all taxes.
Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics.
T FTTRate Federal ticket tax rate.Source: Air Transport Association.
t UnitTax
Sum of all unit taxes (i.e., FST+FSSF+PFC).
Source: Air Transport Association (FST and FSSF), Federal 
Aviation Administration (PFC).
ATACostlndex ATACostlndex U.S. airline cost index.Source: Air Transport Association.
LCCShare LCCShare Low-cost carrier market share of revenue passenger miles. Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics.
U Unempr
Route specific unemployment rate, derived from underlying 
seasonally adjusted state employment data.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Y Q n
Quarter fixed effects (n represents the quarter in question, for 
example n = 2 for the second quarter [Q2]).
6 Time Time trend variable used in aggregate estimation (integer set to 1 through n, where n is the number of quarterly observations)
0) Ynnnn
Year fixed effects used in estimation of sub-markets (nnnn 
represents the year in question, for example nnnn = 2005 for 
the year 2005 [Y20051).
P xxxzzz
Route fixed effects (XXX and YYY represent the three-letter 
airport identifiers for the airports which form the route, for 
example ATL for Atlanta and BOS for Boston [ATLBOS]).
Data
The main data source used for ticket specific information is a database prepared by the 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) of the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT). 
This Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) is related to the DB1A database referred to in 
Chapter III. DB1B contains “the full itinerary and the dollar amounts paid by each passenger...
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summarized by routing and fare” for a “continuous 10% sample of airline tickets” (BTS, n.d., 
para. 7). Because DB1B aggregates sampled tickets with identical routings and fares, each 
record can correspond to more than one passenger. A data field in each record indicates the 
number of passengers for which the record applies.
DBIBMarket
DB1B consists of three sub-tables: DB1 BCoupon, DB1 BMarket, and DB1 BTicket (BTS, 
2006b). For this study, DB1 BMarket is used, which “contains directional market characteristics of 
each domestic itinerary of the Origin and Destination Survey, such as the reporting carrier, origin 
and destination airport, prorated market fare, number of market coupons, market miles flown, and 
carrier change indicators” (BTS, 2006b).
Airlines report total fares for each sample ticket to the USDOT, whether one-way or 
round-trip. BTS then constructs DB1 BMarket to consist of directional data, with round trip tickets 
represented by two records -  one for each direction. As a result, all fare information in this study 
is presented on a “one-way” basis and there is no means of distinguishing between data from 
round-trip vs. one-way tickets. Approximate round-trip prices can be obtained by doubling listed 
fare values. Also, for the purpose of this study, both directions of any one market have been 
combined. For example, data for flights from Atlanta to Boston have been combined with flights 
from Boston to Atlanta. Market identifiers (e.g., “ATLBOS”) are created by concatenating the 
three-letter airport identifiers for the two airports forming the market (in alphabetical order).
The DB1B database does not indicate the amount of ticket taxes and fees collected from 
passengers. These have to be retroactively computed based on the itinerary and total fare. This 
is done through a simple process. The individual steps are shown below, using tax rates and 
levels for 2006 as an example:
1. FST  = $3.30 n , where n is the number of segments (i.e., n =  1 indicates a non­
stop flight)
2. FSSF = $2.50m in(«, 2) (Note: the federal security fee is only collected for the first 
two segments in each direction of travel)
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3. Look up PFC{ , the passenger facility charge for the origin airport (if a PFC is 
collected at that airport)
4. Look up PFC2, the passenger facility charge for the first connecting airport (if a 
connection exists and a PFC is collected at that airport)
5. PFC = PFCl + PFC2 (Note: PFCs are only collected for the first two airports in 
each direction of travel)
6. UnitTax = FST + PFC + FSSF 
TF -  UnitTax
7. FTT = FTTRate , where FTTRate = 0.075
V 1 + FTTRate
The base fare is also computed, by subtracting the total taxes and fees from the total fare. 
Route and national averages are weighted by the number of passengers. Additional statistics are 
also derived, such as the average track distance and number of connections, although this data is 
not entered into the empirical estimation.
This method of retroactively computing individual taxes and fees has been validated 
against 60 sample tickets representing typical business and recreational itineraries retrieved from 
two major online travel providers (Karlsson, Odoni, and Yamanaka, 2004, p. 288). Online travel 
providers were used, as they identify base fare, taxes, fees, and total fare for any requested 
itinerary.
While DB1B is quarterly database, changes in tax rates and levels often do not coincide 
with the beginning or end of a quarter. In these cases, the tax variable for that time period is 
prorated. For example, if an airport collects a PFC of $3 for the first third of a quarter, and $4.50 
for the last two-thirds, a PFC value of $4 is used. Similarly, if the ad valorem rate drops from 10% 
to 0% in the middle of a quarter, a value of 5% is used for the entire quarter. One benefit of using 
quarterly averages is that this attenuates any discrepancies between the amount of tax collected 
on the day of sale and that in effect on the day of travel, which can occur several months later.
PFC collection levels and their start and end dates are published by the FAA (2006) on a 
monthly basis. Changes in PFC collections can be relatively frequent. As an extreme example,
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Reno-Tahoe International Airport had seven changes in PFC collection during the 1994-2005 
period. As part of this study, a PFC lookup tool was developed based on the FAA data, which 
allows the PFC for any airport to be determined for any quarter in the period 1992Q1-2006Q4.
One weakness of the DB1B data is that the intermediate airport on one-stop continuing 
itineraries is not recorded. A one-stop continuing itinerary occurs when a passenger lands at an 
intermediate airport and subsequently departs on the same aircraft, usually with the same flight 
number. This differs from a connecting flight, where the passenger changes aircraft and flight 
numbers usually change. For example, if a passenger travels from Boston to Los Angeles via 
Chicago without changing aircraft, the Chicago stopover does not show up in DB1B. Thus, one- 
stop continuing flights look identical to nonstop flights in the data set. Neither a federal security 
service fee, nor a passenger facility charge is collected at the intermediate airport, since the 
passenger is not considered to constitute an enplanement. The segment tax, however, is 
collected for all segments of the flight, This is not captured by the tax computation process used 
for this study. Any discrepancies resulting from this flaw in the data should be quite small, in most 
cases just the amount of the segment tax (approximately $3).
This study also does not attempt to identify rural airports which are excluded from the 
collection of federal segment taxes. Flights to and from rural airports account for only 0.17% of all 
passengers (Karlsson, Odoni, and Yamanaka, 2004, p. 288).
In the precursor research to this study, a series of fare rules were applied to filter out 
records which were thought to have excessively low or high fares (Karlsson, Odoni, and 
Yamanaka, 2004, p. 289). The fare rules were a slightly modified version of rules developed by 
the USDOT Office of the Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs. This office is a 
major user of the DB1A and DB1B origin-destination surveys. A post-estimation sensitivity 
analysis revealed that these fare rules had very little impact on the results. For example, 
depending on the set of filters applied, the average ETR for 2002Q2 varied by only -0.1 to 0.8 
percentage points from the result with all filters applied (Karlsson, Odoni, and Yamanaka, 2004, 
p. 291).
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Given the lack of sensitivity of the ETR calculations to the application of fare filters, this 
study uses a simplified set of filters, as they are computationally intensive,. The filters applied in 
this study remove the following records:
1. Records with travel outside the continental U.S.
2. Records with zero passengers
3. Records with zero total fare (e.g., frequent flyer awards)
4. Records marked as “bulk fare”
5. Records with non-positive base fare
6. Records with base fares greater than or equal to $2,500
After taxes are subtracted from the total fare, it is possible for base fares to be negative.
It is assumed that these are data errors, and these records are rejected. These filters assume an 
upper threshold for base fares set at $2,500. This is consistent with the upper limit used in earlier 
work on ticket taxes (Karlsson, Odoni, and Yamanaka, 2004, p. 289).
Even after application of the filters, the data sets are very large. The number of records, 
before and after filtering, is shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. The designation “Filter 1” refers to steps 
1 through 4 from the above list, whereas “Filter 2” refers to the last two steps. The majority of 
rejected records are result of the first collection of filters, although this balance shifted somewhat 
towards the end of the time series. As can be seen, the number of records in the database has 
increased over time, commensurate with increased demand for air travel. Overall, 148.6 million 
records were processed, with 130.7 million remaining after filtering.
Not all time periods shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 are used for the regression analysis. In 
particular, no data from 2001 is used, in order to avoid the volatile period following the events of 
September 11, 2001. Also, the last quarter in 2005 is excluded, since the ATA cost index and the 
data used to compute the LCC market share had not been released for that time period when the 
analysis was conducted.
This analysis resulted in the creation of an extensive time series of passenger weighted 
averages for total fare, base fare, ticket taxes and fees, effective tax rate, track distance, and 
number of segments per ticket. No data set of this nature has been developed previously and it is
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likely to have applications beyond this study. Summaries of this data are presented in Tables 4.4 
and 4.5, expressed on an annual basis for the periods 1994-1997 and 2001-2005, respectively.
Table 4.2: Filter statistics (1994Q1-1997Q4)
Number of Records
Before After After
Quarter filtering Filter 1 Ratio Filter 2 Ratio
1994Q1 2,876,398 2,516,047 87.5% 2,505,275 87.1%
1994Q2 3,133,457 2,756,584 88.0% 2,743,500 87.6%
1994Q3 3,214,432 2,820,564 87.7% 2,799,671 87.1%
1994Q4 3,321,120 2,942,321 88.6% 2,929,694 88.2%
1995Q1 3,143,892 2,791,847 88.8% 2,781,358 88.5%
1995Q2 3,405,076 3,009,020 88.4% 2,999,807 88.1%
1995Q3 3,411,652 2,985,809 87.5% 2,972,944 87.1%
1995Q4 3,638,244 3,189,154 87.7% 3,173,603 87.2%
1996Q1 3,656,776 3,249,352 88.9% 3,236,266 88.5%
1996Q2 3,660,591 3,193,258 87.2% 3,180,661 86.9%
1996Q3 3,581,307 3,131,776 87.4% 3,122,364 87.2%
1996Q4 3,726,559 3,307,457 88.8% 3,297,690 88.5%
1997Q1 3,466,382 3,077,375 88.8% 3,068,521 88.5%
1997Q2 3,876,904 3,467,389 89.4% 3,454,739 89.1%
1997Q3 3,871,629 3,448,596 89.1% 3,436,464 88.8%
1997Q4 3,809,567 3,414,692 89.6% 3,399,344 89.2%
Total 55,793,986 49,301,241 88.4% 49,101,901 88.0%
Table 4.3: Filter statistics (2001Q1-2005Q4)
Number of Records
Before After After
Quarter filtering Filter 1 Ratio Filter 2 Ratio
2001Q1 4,225,419 3,762,903 89.1% 3,749,960 88.7%
2001Q2 4,864,353 4,325,967 88.9% 4,310,419 88.6%
2001Q3 4,386,059 3,878,601 88.4% 3,865,421 88.1%
2001Q4 4,299,606 3,836,241 89.2% 3,824,962 89.0%
2002Q1 4,257,426 3,836,055 90.1% 3,752,368 88.1%
2002Q2 4,670,648 4,270,203 91.4% 4,069,497 87.1%
2002Q3 4,521,610 4,143,192 91.6% 3,940,904 87.2%
2002Q4 4,457,483 4,114,750 92.3% 3,932,895 88.2%
2003Q1 3,968,611 3,635,534 91.6% 3,480,872 87.7%
2003Q2 4,690,418 4,262,522 90.9% 4,090,994 87.2%
2003Q3 4,403,147 3,863,451 87.7% 3,804,442 86.4%
2003Q4 4,800,205 4,390,597 91.5% 4,231,072 88.1%
2004Q1 4,243,960 3,895,564 91.8% 3,722,115 87.7%
2004Q2 4,950,846 4,544,769 91.8% 4,337,792 87.6%
2004Q3 4,667,842 4,270,082 91.5% 4,048,262 86.7%
2004Q4 5,032,710 4,664,109 92.7% 4,449,083 88.4%
2005Q1 4,664,067 4,304,220 92.3% 4,122,703 88.4%
2005Q2 5,330,050 4,922,769 92.4% 4,706,419 88.3%
2005Q3 5,198,582 4,790,959 92.2% 4,567,381 87.9%
2005Q4 5,131,322 4,759,190 92.7% 4,554,981 88.8%
Total 92,764,364 84,471,678 91.1% 81,562,542 87.9%
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1994 10,978,140 2.6 28,129,335 956 1.40
1995 11,927,712 2.4 28,883,862 960 1.39
1996 12,836,981 2.4 31,443,270 972 1.38
1997 13,359,068 2.5 33,485,858 987 1.38
2001 15,750,762 2.2 35,186,269 1,038 1.38
2002 15,695,664 2.1 33,460,132 1,062 1.39
2003 15,607,380 2.2 34,164,984 1,081 1.39
2004 16,557,252 2.3 37,348,201 1,094 1.36
2005 17,951,484 2.2 39,707,597 1,086 1.35
Table 4.5: Annual averages of fares and taxes
Year BF FTT PFC FSSF FST TTF TF ETR
1994 $145.87 $14.59 $2.54 $0.00 $0.00 $17.12 $163.00 11.7%
1995 $149.30 $14.93 $2.86 $0.00 $0.00 $17.79 $167.08 11.9%
1996 $151.09 $5.16 $2.79 $0.00 $0.00 $7.95 $159.04 5.3%
1997 $152.76 $12.30 $3.11 $0.00 $0.35 $15.76 $168.52 10.3%
2001 $153.11 $11.48 $3.90 $0.00 $3.80 $19.18 $172.30 12.5%
2002 $144.90 $10.87 $4.60 $3.15 $4.17 $22.79 $167.69 15.7%
2003 $147.07 $11.03 $4.87 $2.24 $4.16 $22.30 $169.37 15.2%
2004 $141.04 $10.58 $4.97 $3.35 $4.23 $23.12 $164.17 16.4%
2005 $143.56 $10.77 $5.10 $3.32 $4.32 $23.51 $167.07 16.4%
The data indicates steady growth in the total number of passenger in the sample. The 
annualized growth rate from 1994 to 2005 levels is 3.2%. This growth primarily reflects increasing 
air travel, but some of it may be due to changes in data reporting requirements or improvements 
in data quality. There has also been a very gradual growth in track miles per ticket (i.e., the actual 
distance flown over the surface of the Earth). This may reflect a reduction in short-haul flights 
since September 11, 2001. Finally, the average number of coupons has declined slightly, 
indicating that there has been a minor reduction in the share of passengers who connect.
A striking result of this analysis is that base fares have remained relatively constant, even 
as flight distances have grown. In real terms, base fares have declined approximately 25%.
Taxes have increased in nominal terms, but have remained virtually constant when adjusted for 
inflation (Yamanaka, Karlsson, and Odoni, 2005, p. 5). Consequently, the effective tax rate has 
increased by almost five percentage points in the time period covered here.
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The ETR values reported in Table 4.5 are comparable to those derived in earlier work 
(see Table 2.1). For example, Table 4.5 shows that the yearly ETR for 1994 is 11.7%, compared 
to the 1993Q2 value of 10.9% shown in Table 2.1. The yearly ETR for 2004 shown in Table 4.5 is 
estimated at 16.4%, compared to the 20004Q2 value of 16.5% in Table 2.1. This provides 
evidence that the methodology used here produces results comparable to previously published 
data, even though the underlying databases and techniques vary slightly.
The approach used here represents an improvement over earlier methods in several 
ways. The previous analyses are limited to flights with no more than one connection in any 
direction and exclude open jaw itineraries, as well as any market with fewer than ten passengers. 
Also, the DB1B data used here is publicly available in an electronic, online format, unlike the 
DB1A database used in the earlier research.
Other Data Sources
Historical federal ticket tax rates and levels of the segment tax and federal security fee 
are obtained from ATA (2005, 2006e). PFC values are obtained from the FAA (2006). The Airline 
Cost Index is prepared by the ATA (2006d). The cost index reflects major airline cost categories, 
notably labor and fuel. It excludes taxes, as these are handled off-budget, but does include 
landing fees and other payments to government entities, such as leases for terminal space. The 
largest cost categories are summarized in Table 4.6.




Aircraft ownership costs 7.7%
Non-aircraft ownership costs 4.4%
Professional services 8.0%
Subtotal 68.9%
All other categories 31.1%
Note: Based on 2005Q3 data
The index is based on nominal costs and normalized to a value of 100 for the year 1982. In 1992 
the index value was 155.8, increasing to 183.5 by 2004 (ATA, 2006d).
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The LCC market share is computed using carrier specific revenue passenger mile data. 
The market share is derived using so-called Schedule T2 data collected from USDOT Form 41 
carrier filings. While the Form 41 data is monthly, T2 consists of quarterly summaries of some of 
the Form 41 elements, including total revenue passenger miles for all service classes (BTS, 
2006a). The use of LCC share of revenue passenger miles as a measure of market share is 
consistent with work by other authors (e.g., Ito and Lee, 2004, p. 17).
Seasonally adjusted state unemployment data is used as an overall control for 
exogenous factors related to overall economic conditions. A market unemployment rate is 
computed for each market, based on state data corresponding to the geographic location of the 
two airports that define the market (denoted here by the subscripts 1 and 2):
U , + U 2
(60)
h  + l 2
where U is total unemployment and L  is the size of the labor force. This method of computing a 
market based unemployment places more weight on larger population areas. This provides some 
control for the relative size of economic activity at the market start and end locations, but only at 
the state level. Publicly available data from the Bureau Labor of Statistics is used for the 
computations (BLS, 2006).
The use of state level employment data is a somewhat coarse tool. It does not 
adequately handle airports which are located near state borders, and which have large impacts 
on neighboring states (e.g., Newark International Airport). Ideally, the geographic unit should be 
the airport’s market catchment area, roughly defined as a driving distance of one to two hours 
from the airport. However, while state level data is imperfect, it is readily available and 
computationally efficient. An alternate approach would be to use locally defined data, such as 
unemployment information for Metropolitan Statistical Areas. This might more closely capture the 
economic conditions within the market capture area of each airport.
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Measuring Market Concentration
In order to study the price impact of route specific competition, a market concentration 
variable such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) should ideally be used. HHI is defined as:
where a tj is the individual share of carrier j  in market i , which is served by n carriers. For a 
market dominated by a single carrier, H H li - 1, which is the upper bound on the index. An 
intuitive interpretation of H H It is that its inverse is a measure of the effective number of
competitors in the market (Morrison and Winston, 1995, p. 8).
The drawback of using HHI in this study is that it is very computationally intensive given 
the large number of observations. Unfortunately, market specific HHI data is not available through 
other sources for the time periods in question. Consequently, the approach taken here is to pool 
the data into two subsets of twenty markets. One pool consists of highly competitive markets (i.e., 
markets with many carriers with significant market shares), whereas the other pool consists of 
highly concentrated markets (i.e., markets dominated by a single carrier).
Markets are assigned to the pools using an approximate measure of concentration. This 
measure is based on statistics available in the quarterly Consumer Air Fare Report, published by 
the USDOT Office of the Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs (2006). This 
report includes average fares for each market, as well as the average fare and market share for 
the carriers with the largest market share and lowest fare, respectively.
Using the limited market share data available, upper and lower bounds for / / / / / ,  are 
computed using the following expressions (the route subscript is dropped for clarity):
where crL is the market share of the largest carrier and crLF is the market share of the low fare 
carrier. If the dominant and low fare carriers are one and the same, then crLF is set to zero.
n
(61)
= c r2L + o 2lf + max(0, n -  3)<t32 + o \ (62)
(63)
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The term a 3 is an approximation of market shares number 3 through n - 1. The 
computation of a 3 makes use of the knowledge that crL is an upper bound for the market share 
of any other carrier:
The true number of carriers in the market is not known. The parameter n is a counter which 
indicates the number of market shares tracked by this algorithm. Note that two of these market 
shares may have a zero value, namely crLF and a n . The counter n is given by:
The algorithm for estimating H H I^  is best illustrated by an example. Consider the
market Columbus-San Francisco in 1997Q2. The dominant carrier was Delta, with a market share 
of 20.1%. The low fare carrier was Northwest, with a market share of 17.9%. The combined 
market share of these two carriers is given by a L + crLF = 38% . The remainder of the market 
allocated to other carriers is given by 1 -  a L -  o LF =  62% .
The next market shares are represented by a 3. By definition, these can be no more than
Delta’s market share of 20.1%. Another limitation, stated by Equation 64, is that & 3 can be no
more than the balance of the market share after the dominant and low fare carriers have been 
accounted for. Since Delta’s market share of 20.1% is less than the balance of 62%, it follows 
from Equation 64 that & 3 = 20.1% . Next, n is determined by Equation 66. Dividing a 3 into
62% and rounding down to the nearest integer, reveals that the balance of 62% allows for three 
additional carrier shares at the 20.1% level. The total number of market shares tracked by this
<T, =  mini (64)
Finally, the remaining market share crn is computed as: 
crn = min(<T3,1 -  <yL -  <j l f  -  a 3 max(0, n -  3)) (65)
(66)
where |_ J represents the floor operator. Note that if a 3 -  0 , n is set to three.
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algorithm is given by n =  6 (i.e., the market share of the dominant carrier, the market share of 
the low fare carrier, three market shares at <t3 = 20.1% , and a n). The final market share, a n
is computed according to Equation 65 as <7n -  62% -  3 x  20.1% = 1.7%. As a check, the total 
market share can be derived by simple addition: 20.1% + 17.9% + 3 x20 .1%  +1.7%  = 100% . 
The upper bound in this example is H H I^  = 0.2012 + 0 .1 7 9 2 + 3 x 0 .2 0 1 2 + 0 .0 1 7 2 = 0 .1 9 4 .
In comparison, the lower bound is H H I^  = 0.2012 + 0.1792 = 0.072. Consequently, this 
market would be classified as competitive for the purpose of this study.
The 1997Q2 Consumer Air Fare Report contains the earliest available data on the market 
share of the largest and the low fare carrier, respectively. It is used to define the pools of markets 
studied for the 1994-1997 time period. The 2003Q3 report is used to define the pools of markets 
studied for the 2002-2005 period. An underlying assumption is that market concentration does not 
change dramatically over the course of these four-year periods. The competitive and 
concentrated pools are selected from markets with at least 250 daily passengers (755 airport 
pairs met this threshold in the 1997Q2 report, and 789 in the 2003Q3 report). For the 1994-1997 
period, the average lower and upper bounds of the HHI estimates are 0.442 and 0.523, 
respectively, with an average spread of 0.081. For the 2002-2005 period, the average lower and 
upper bounds are 0.420 and 0.511, respectively, and the average spread between the bounds is 
0.091.
The competitive pool of markets is selected by taking 20 random markets from the subset 
of all markets with H H I ^  <  0.3 . This threshold is met in 53 markets in the 1997Q2 report and
81 in the 2003Q3 report. The concentrated pool of markets is selected using H H I^  > 0 .8 . This
threshold is met in 58 markets in the 1997Q2 report and 86 in the 2003Q3 report. Markets 
containing airports with close substitutes are removed from the candidate list of concentrated 
markets. For example, the Oakland-Reno market appears as a market dominated by a single 
carrier, with H H I^ n = 1, but is in fact a competitor to the San Francisco-Reno and San Jose-
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Reno markets. No algorithm was readily available to review the markets for close substitutes.
This was completed by inspection, using maps and FAA airport master records.
Table 4.7 shows the resulting pools of competitive and concentrated markets selected 
from the 1997Q2 Consumer Air Fare Report using the method described above. Table 4.8 shows 
the competitive and concentrated pools selected from the 2003Q3 report. The make-up of the 
pools are airport specific. For example, New York may be represented either by LaGuardia 
Airport (LGA), John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), or Newark Liberty International Airport 
(EWR), depending on the concentration measures for each airport market.
Table 4.7: Markets selected from the 1997Q2 Consumer Air Fare Report
ID Competitive markets ID Concentrated markets
ABQSEA Albuquerque-Seattle ATLBNA Atlanta-Nashville
BDLSFO Hartford-San Francisco ATLCVG Atlanta-Cincinnati
BOSMSY Boston-New Orleans ATLDAY Atlanta-Dayton
BOSSAN Boston-San Diego ATLRIC Atlanta-Richmond
BWISAN Baltimore-San Diego AUSELP Austin-EI Paso
CLEORD Cleveland-Chicago AUSLBB Austin-Lubbock
CMHTPA Columbus-Tampa BDLPHL Hartford-Philadelphia
COSIAD Colorado Springs-Washington, DC BHMMSY Birmingham-New Orleans
EWRSEA New York-Seattle BOSPHL Boston-Philadelphia
FLLLAX Ft. Lauderdale-Los Angeles BOSPIT Boston-Pittsburgh
FLLLGA Ft. Lauderdale-New York BOSROC Boston-Rochester
LASORD Las Vegas-Chicago CLTPHL Charlotte-Philadelphia
LAXMCI Los Angeles-Kansas City DCAPVD Washington, DC-Providence
LAXMKE Los Angeles-Milwaukee DTWMKE Detroit-Milwaukee
LAXMSY Los Angeles-New Orleans DTWMSP Detroit-Minneapolis/St. Paul
LGAPBI New York-West Palm Beach INDPHL Indianapolis-Philadelphia
MCOSEA Orlando-Seattle MCIOKC Kansas City-Oklahoma City
MCOSFO Orlando-San Francisco MKEMSP Milwaukee-Minneapolis/St. Paul
ORDPHX Chicago-Phoenix PHLPIT Philadelphia-Pittsburgh
PHXSEA Phoenix-Seattle SANSMF San Diego-Sacramento
Competitive markets generally consist of long distance markets, with an average distance 
of approximately 1,600 miles. The concentrated markets are mostly short haul markets, with an 
average distance of approximately 400 miles. The concentrated markets also include a relatively 
high number of intra-state routes, such as Austin-EI Paso and Philadelphia-Pittsburgh. Several 
cities appear multiple times in each pool, such as Ft. Lauderdale, Los Angeles, and New York in 
the competitive markets, and Atlanta, Austin, and El Paso in the concentrated markets. A bit more 
unusual is that some cities, such as Boston and San Diego appear repeatedly in both pools. This
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emphasizes that to a large extent, the level of concentration is route specific, and not predicated 
by a specific airport, at least in the case of large airports.
Table 4.8: Markets selected from the 2003Q3 Consumer Air Fare Report
ID Competitive markets ID Concentrated markets
BDLLAS Hartford-Las Vegas ABQLAS Albuquerque-Las Vegas
BOSLAX Boston-Los Angeles ATLCVG Atlanta-Cincinnati
BOSPHX Boston-Phoenix ATLRIC Atlanta-Richmond
DENMCO Denver-Orlando BHMMSY Birmingham-New Orleans
DFWSLC Dallas/Ft. Worth-Salt Lake City BNAMSY Nashville-New Orleans
EWRLAX New York-Los Angeles BNARDU Nashville-Raleigh/Durham
EWRORD New York-Chicago BOSPIT Boston-Pittsburgh
FLLMCI Ft. Lauderdale-Kansas City BOSRSW Boston-Ft. Myers
INDSEA Indianapolis-Seattle DFWSTL Dallas/Ft. Worth-St. Louis
JAXMDW Jacksonville-Chicago ELPPHX El Paso-Phoenix
JFKTPA New York-Tampa ELPSAT El Paso-San Antonio
LAXMCO Los Angeles-Orlando LASRNO Las Vegas-Reno
LAXPVD Los Angeles-Providence MCIMSP Kansas City-Minneapolis/St. Paul
LGAMSY New Orleans-New York MCIOKC Kansas City-Oklahoma City
LGARDU New York-Raleigh/Durham MSYTPA New Orleans-Tampa
MCIPDX Kansas City-Portland, OR PDXRNO Portland, OR-Reno
MCISEA Kansas City-Seattle PDXSEA Portland, OR-Seattle
MKESFO Milwaukee-San Francisco PHLPIT Philadelphia-Pittsburgh
ORDTPA Chicago-Tampa SANSMF San Diego-Sacramento
PVDSAN Providence-San Diego SANTUS San Diego-Tucson
Data Quality
In 1998, the USDOT Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued an audit report for the 
passenger origin-destination survey which is the main source of data for this study. The audit 
found that over two-thirds of markets did not meet the 95% accuracy criterion set by USDOT 
officials (OIG, 1998, p. iii). In terms of passengers, the results are better, in that “only” 38% of all 
passengers failed to meet the accuracy standard. This seems to suggest that high density 
markets have more accurate reporting. The audit also concluded that there were systematic 
differences in reporting quality across carriers. However, the carriers were not individually 
identified by the OIG. There also seemed to be systematic errors for specific airports. For 
example, Dulles was cited as being particularly inaccurate (OIG, 1998, p. 9).
The identified causes for these problems were numerous, including inability to accurately 
report code sharing (this seems to have been rectified with a subsequent rule change that 
requires reporting both the "ticketing carrier" and "operating carrier"), invalid airport codes (e.g.,
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"NEW" for "Newark"), incorrect reporting of bulk air fares (four carriers were found to have used 
999 instead of 99999, which led to a fare entry of $999 instead of marking the fare as a bulk fare), 
improper data processing (two carriers simply deleted data when a problem was found, such as 
an invalid airport code), outdated fare caps, outdated data collection procedures, and general 
non-compliance with BTS regulations. Of particular interest to this study, the audit reported that 
some air carriers “incorrectly submitted fares net of taxes” (OIG, 1998, p. vi). The report also 
found that as an oversight agency, the BTS was not effective in monitoring the quality of the data.
There is evidence that the data quality has improved since the OIG audit. After contacting 
the BTS to try to assess the current quality of the data, the Assistant Director of the Office of 
Airline Information made the following statement: “ I believe the data quality of the Passenger O-D 
Survey is good, based upon a recent evaluation from our Office of Statistical Quality” (D. Bright, 
personal communication, 2003, October 2). Consequently, it is likely that data problems are more 
of a concern for the 1994-1997 analysis than for the one covering 2002-2005.
Despite these concerns, there is little choice than to rely on the passenger origin- 
destination survey for this study. There simply is no equivalent data set and it clearly has become 
the industry standard for ticket level studies. Many of the data errors are likely to be random, and 
should not significantly alter the results. However, some of the data quality problems introduce 
systematic biases which cannot be detected. At a minimum, some caution must be exercised in 
interpreting the results of any study relying on the DB1B data set.
Variation in Taxes
In the absence of a natural experiment, this study relies on variations in tax rates and 
levels over time. As shown in Table 1.1, there has been a gradual reduction in the ad valorem 
rate since 1992. Also, PFC levels have gradually been increasing over time. The same is true for 
the segment tax, which is inflation adjusted annually to the nearest $0.10. However, these 
variations are relatively small in amplitude and heavily time trended.
There are two episodes since the 1990s which have produced shock-like variations. The 
first episode consists of two periods during 1996-1997 when the federal authority to collect ticket 
taxes lapsed. The specific dates for the periods in question are January 1 -August 26,1996 and
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January 1-March 6, 1997 (ATA, 2006a). This lapse in tax collection authority explains the sharp 
drop in ETR from 11.9% in 1995 to 5.3% in 1996, which is shown in Table 4.5. Figure 4.1 
graphically represents the history of the federal ticket tax, and clearly shows this lapse of tax 
collection authority. The second episode occurred during the period June 1-September 30, 2003, 
when Congress suspended the federal security service fee. The goal of this tax holiday was to 
provide financial relief to the airline industry during the war with Iraq (Emergency Wartime
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003). This episode is shown graphically in Figure 4.2.









1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Q u a r t e r  ( 1 9 9 2 Q 1 - 2 0 0 6 Q 4 )
Note: Tax rate prorated when changes do not coincide with beginning or end of quarter
The timing of these episodes determined the time periods selected for analysis in this 
study. The intent is to include two years of observations prior to the tax shock, followed by one 
year after the shock. For the first episode, which began in 1996Q1 and ended approximately 
midway through 1996Q3, the period 1994Q1-1997Q4 is selected, for a total of 16 quarters. 
However, it should be noted that a second expiration of tax collection authority took place in 
1997Q1.
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-igure 4,2: History of federal security service fee (2001Q1-2006Q4) 
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Q u a r t e r  ( 2 0 0 1 Q 1 - 2 0 0 6 Q 4 )
2005 2006
Note: Tax level prorated when changes do not coincide with beginning or end of quarter
The second episode began partway through 2003Q2 and ended at the close of 2003Q3. 
Using similar reasoning as applied to the first episode, the preferred period selected for analysis 
would be 2001Q1 through 2004Q4. However, in order to avoid the shock to the industry caused 
by the events of September 11, 2001, the period 2002Q1 through 2005Q3 is selected instead, for 
a total of 15 quarters (some 2005Q4 data was not available at the time of analysis).
It is of some importance to try to determine the degree to which these shocks were 
anticipated, and also whether they were thought to be temporary or not. Anticipated and/or 
permanent lapses of taxes are likely to affect the economic decisions of airlines and passengers 
in ways different than unanticipated, temporary lapses. One example would be that some 
travelers might postpone travel to wait for the start of an anticipated tax holiday.
The first shock appears to have taken the industry by surprise: The lapse in federal tax 
collection authority was caused by protracted congressional negotiations over the future shape of 
the federal ticket tax structure. While it should have been clear to all parties that negotiations
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were in progress, there is no evidence showing widespread belief that Congress would let the 
authority to collect taxes expire. One indication of this is that the General Accounting Office 
(GAO; since July 7, 2004 called the Government Accountability Office) seems to have been 
operating in a reactive mode: Its first report addressing the impact of the lapse was released in 
April of 1996, near the middle of the episode (GAO, 1996a). The temporary nature of this episode 
should have been evident, due to the importance of the federal taxes in funding the FAA and the 
U.S. air transportation infrastructure. This is emphasized by the two GAO reports on the topic 
(1996a, 1996b).
The 2003 security tax holiday was to some extent anticipated, as it was a planned relief 
effort for the airline industry (Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003). It is 
likely to at least in part have come about due to lobbying by the industry. It is possible that the 
advance knowledge of this tax holiday led to a more gradual price response, which may result in 
a time-shifted response in tax incidence. However, any plans to institute price changes prior to 
the effective date of the holiday may have been tempered by federal antitrust oversight. On the 
demand side, it is less likely that the typical airline passenger would have been aware of the tax 
holiday. The 2003 episode was crafted from the beginning as temporary tax holiday and should 
not have been anticipated by any party to have been permanent.
The temporary nature of both episodes may have impacts on the price response. This 
could limit the ability to translate the empirical estimates developed here into more generalized 
conclusions. It is difficult to determine the direction of any possible bias, however. On one hand 
airlines could have attempted to recoup the tax savings in the form of increased revenue. 
Conversely, the tax breaks could have resulted in increased price competition in some markets. 
The transaction costs of republishing fares may also have been a factor. The temporary nature of 
the tax shocks also raises political or strategic considerations not captured in the models used 
here. For example, congressional scrutiny may encourage airlines to pass along any tax savings 
to consumers. Conversely, airlines may retain the entire tax savings to signal their precarious 
financial situation. Fare wars triggered by tax changes is another possible outcome.
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The 2003 security tax holiday differs from the 1996 and 1997 lapses in tax collection 
authority in that the former features no variation in the ad valorem tax rate. Consequently, r  is 
excluded from the model specifications for the period 2002Q1-2005Q3, in order to avoid perfect 
multicollinearity. A linear specification is used as the primary specification, as this provides a 
direct estimation of the tax incidence of the unit tax. In the aggregate case, the following linear 
specification is used instead of Equation 58:
= A  + / U  + P^ATACostlndex, + A ^ C S k a re , + M  ^
+ yt +e,
For the competitive and concentrated pools, a linear specification replaces Equation 59:
Pu = 0 0 + 0 2  ht + 03 ATACostlndex, + P6uit
-  _  -  (68)
+ Y ,  +  COt + P i  + £ it
In the linear specifications without the ad valorem tax, (32 is straightforwardly interpreted 
as the incidence of the total unit tax. An alternate logarithmic (log-log) specification is used to test 
for robustness to functional form. In a fully logarithmic specification, the coefficient represents the 
price elasticity with respect to the unit tax. In order to generate an estimate of the tax incidence of 
the unit tax, the point elasticity must be evaluated at the sample means of the tax inclusive price 
and the total unit tax.
Hypotheses
While there does not appear to be any previously published econometric analysis of
ticket tax incidence, a GAO report summarizing the impact of commercial aviation taxes and fees
briefly addressed the issue. The report found that (GAO, 2004, p. 4):
During the 1996 ticket tax lapse and 2003 security fee holiday, carriers generally 
raised “base” airfares (i.e., airfares net of taxes and fees) compared with what 
they were in periods before the absence of the tax or fee. The effect of this to 
consumers was to maintain or increase gross fares. These fare increases were 
more moderate in markets where a low-cost carrier (e.g., Southwest) was 
operating and among leisure travelers.
Ignoring the possibility of negative incidence (i.e., an increase in gross fares resulting from a
declining tax), this implies zero incidence when the tax initially lapsed. For the 1996 episode, the
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GAO studied thirteen markets, but published results for only four, some competitive and some 
concentrated. For example, Las Vegas-Los Angeles was used as a competitive market. This 
market was described as one “in which a low-cost carrier competed against two network airlines” 
and in which “all carriers raised their average base fares at some point during the tax lapse, but 
no one raised them over 15 percent” (GAO, 2004, p. 8).
Conversely, for the Northwest Airlines dominated Billings-Minneapolis/St. Paul market, 
the GAO report found that “carriers raised their average base fares by as much as 52 percent” 
(GAO, 2004, p. 9). The report also found that “after the tax was reinstated, most carriers 
increased these average base fares in these four markets (compared with the average base fares 
in effect during the fourth quarter of 1995), but not to the same extent as when the tax initially 
lapsed” (GAO, 2005, p. 9). This increase in base fare was found to be more pronounced for 
business travelers.
For the 2003 episode, the GAO contracted Harrell Associates to study “week-over-week 
changes by seven carriers in each of their 20 largest passenger markets” (GAO, 2004, p. 9). Here, 
the GAO found that base business fares were raised in over 80% of markets, but leisure base 
fares were not raised to the same degree (GAO, 2004, p. 9). The GAO attributes this difference in 
incidence to “greater competition for leisure passengers” (GAO, 2004, p. 9). Again, the GAO also 
found evidence for an asymmetric response to the direction of the tax change: “After the security 
fee was reimposed beginning in October 2003, carriers generally did not restore those base fares 
to their prior lower levels” (GAO, 2004, p. 9). If the GAO’s analysis is correct, it would indicate that 
the tax burden is carried by the producer prior to the tax holiday, and by the consumer afterwards.
Note that the GAO report does not address variations in the unit tax during the 1996 
episode (which, admittedly, are relatively small). Also, since the ad valorem rate has remained 
constant at 7.5% since 1999, the GAO’s analysis of the 2003 security tax holiday only addresses 
variation in unit taxes. In order to draw any conclusions from the GAO study about the 
relationship between tax shifting caused by ad valorem taxes and that caused by unit taxes, one 
would need to compare the ad valorem incidence from the earlier episode with unit tax incidence 
of the later episode. This is difficult for a number of reasons: It might potentially ignore structural
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changes in the industry in the intervening years; the GAO only provides a qualitative analysis and
does not report any numerical estimates of incidence; and the markets analyzed and the
methodologies applied varied significantly between the two episodes.
Formulating testable hypotheses based on the GAO study is a speculative exercise at
best. The GAO itself admits that that there are many factors which affect fares, but which are not
controlled for in its analysis (GAO, 2004, p. 8):
Carriers alter their fares in response to many factors, and more rigorous analysis 
would be needed to isolate the effect of each factor. Therefore, we cannot 
exclude other exogenous factors from accounting for these changes in base 
fares. That is, it is possible that the fare changes that occurred in these two 
instances may have been the result of factors other than the absence of a tax or 
fee and the presence or absence of low-cost carriers, such as changing 
economic and competitive conditions in those markets.
Consequently, the fare changes observed by the GAO may have been due to factors other than
variations in taxes.
Generally, models of competitive markets predict a symmetric price response to changes 
in taxes. Consequently, the notion that tax incidence may be a function of the direction of the tax 
change is excluded by the theoretical framework presented in Chapter III. It may be possible 
under some forms of imperfect competition not specifically analyzed in Chapter III. Ultimately, it 
may be difficult to construct a theoretical model which captures the institutional and political 
intricacies which could explain this outcome.
An asymmetric price effect to tax changes may also be difficult to observe using quarterly 
data. This effect was most pronounced in the work completed by Harrell Associates on behalf of 
the GAO. This analysis used week-over-week changes for the two weeks straddling the 
beginning of the episode and the two weeks straddling the end. Hence, the GAO’s findings may 
reflect a short term effect. This study uses quarterly data points, which may only reveal longer 
term effects. While a quarter may seem to be a relatively short time period, air travel features a 
high frequency of price changes compared to other goods and services. Air fares lagged behind 
only tomatoes and gasoline in terms of frequency of price changes, according to a study of over 
350 categories of goods (Bils and Klenow, 2004, pp. 974-983).
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The airline industry has issued its own qualitative assessments of tax incidence. ATA has
presented a consistent message that the airlines have lost pricing power and are unable to pass
along any increases in taxes to consumers. According to Lori Sharpe Day, ATA’s Vice President
of Government Affairs, the 2003 tax holiday demonstrated that producer prices marched in lock
step with changes in the security fee (ATA, 2004):
While airlines collect these taxes from their customers, the dispute really focuses 
on who ends up paying.
People who understand the industry know that U.S. airlines absorb these costs 
themselves. The average fare has declined sharply since 9/11 and U.S. airlines 
have no pricing power to pass along these costs due to competitive pressures 
and a substantial decline in travelers’ willingness to pay. It’s worth pointing out 
that when Congress suspended the passenger security fees in the summer of 
2003, airline yields improved, only to decline a short time later when the 
passenger security fees were reimposed in the fall of 2003.
In the end, U.S. airlines end up eating these security costs, adversely impacting 
their revenues. It seems obvious to me that if we could pass along all these costs 
we would. Then we all would be making money.
Formulating a hypothesis which matches this description is straightforward: This statement 
implies that the incidence of unit taxes is zero (i.e., = 0 ) .  However, ATA has not published
any specific data to support this statement. Given ATA’s role as a special interest group, some 
caution must be applied in using this statement to form a scientific hypothesis. However, it is 
certainly possible to test the hypothesis, regardless of whether one finds it credible or not.
The hypotheses = 0 and /?2 = 0 are also equivalent to the GAO’s finding that the
producer carries the full burden during the beginning of a lapse in taxation, i.e. when the tax first 
is reduced. Thus, the ATA and GAO statements about tax incidence are consistent when 
describing the decline of a tax. When describing the reinstatement of the tax, however, the 
statements contradict each other: The ATA claims that the tax increase is fully shifted onto the 
producer, so that the incidence remains zero. The GAO on the other hand, states that the burden 
shifts to the consumer, so that the incidence changes to unity (especially for business travel). 
Another hypothesis that follows from the GAO report is the possibility that the incidence is unity 
(i.e., Px = \ )  for small T . Using the linear specification given by Equations 67 and 68, the 
equivalent test for unit taxes is /?2 = 1 ■
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Apart from these somewhat anecdotal hypotheses, the theory of tax incidence allows for 
a broad range of possible outcomes. In the long run, with perfect competition and constant costs, 
tax incidence should be equal to one: By assumption firms are operating at the minimum of their 
long-run average cost curves. However, this does not mean that an empirical result of one 
constitutes a long-run perfect competition condition, as this finding is also possible under other 
assumptions. A specific testable assumption is whether the tax incidence of the ad valorem tax is 
identical to that of the unit tax. In the semilogarithmic specification given by Equations 58 and 59 
this is tested by:
( l + f ) A = 4 - A  (69)
where f , t , and p D represent the sample means of the ad valorem rate, unit tax, and total fare.
The null hypotheses used for post-regression inference testing of the primary model 
specifications analyzed in this study are summarized in Table 4.9. The results from the inferential 
testing are shown in Chapter V, which also includes descriptive statistics. These include the 
means and standard deviations of the observations, as well as coefficient estimates and standard 
errors from the regression analysis. Also, point estimates of tax incidence are provided, using
sample means for p D , t  , and t to convert elasticities to derivatives, as necessary, and to 
calculate the multiplier effect 1 + z .
Table 4.9: Summary of hypothesis testing______________________________________________
Episode Model Ho Hi Motivation
1992Q1 to 
1997Q4 semilog
A = ° 





GAO/ATA statements; incidence borne 
by airlines
GAO/ATA statements; incidence borne 
by passengers
GAO statement; long run perfect comp.
(i+f)$ =4-
— D
/?, ( l+ r)# Pi Market power





A ^ o 
A ^ i
GAO/ATA statements
GAO statement; long run perfect comp.
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Additionally, it is possible that the price response to tax changes is different in the 
competitive pool of markets than in the concentrated pool. The theoretical framework does not 
provide a clear hypothesis for this comparison, but if one assumes that competitive markets 
behave closer to the predictions for perfect competition and concentrated markets closer to the 
predictions for imperfect competition, then different price responses might be expected. As an 
exploratory measure, the hypotheses H 0 : (3u.omp = /3l cnnc and H 0 : /3l  comp = /3l  an( are 
included in the inferential testing.
Historical Background and Extraordinary Events
This study incorporates a historical review of exogenous factors with the potential to 
affect tax incidence results. Table 4.10 summarizes the general financial performance of U.S. 
airlines from 1980 through 2005 (ATA, 2006d). The periods analyzed for this study are 
highlighted. As shown, the 1994-1997 period exhibited strong financial results. This was partly 
due to increased productivity, the maturing of revenue management systems, and the 
introduction of cost saving measures such as cutting travel agent commissions.
One trend is that the number of “effective competitors” dropped sharply from 
approximately twelve to eight in the 1985-1987 period, but had stabilized by the mid-1990s 
(Morrison and Winston, 1995, pp. 8-9). In this context, “effective competitors” is defined as the 
inverse of HHI (recall that HHI decreases with increased competition).
The year 1996 featured two high profile airline accidents, with no survivors in either 
event: On May 11, a Valujet Airlines aircraft crashed in the Everglades after an onboard fire and 
on July 17, flight TWA 800 was destroyed by a fuel tank explosion after taking off from JFK 
International Airport (National Transportation Safety Board, 2002). The impact of these accidents 
on prices is ambiguous, however: Valujet’s safety record may have allowed legacy carriers to 
lessen price competition with LCCs, but a general public perception of reduced safety possibly 
produced an overall downward pressure on fares.
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1980 $32,621 $32,814 ($192) -0..6%
1981 $35,103 $35,480 ($377) -1..1%
1982 $34,913 $35,608 ($695) -2..0%
1983 $37,170 $36,827 $343 0..9%
1984 $41,815 $39,767 $2,048 5..1%
1985 $44,413 $43,061 $1,353 3..1%
1986 $45,141 $44,298 $843 1.,9%
1987 $51,003 $49,064 $1,939 4..0%
1988 $56,801 $53,953 $2,847 5..3%
1989 $60,906 $59,611 $1,295 2..2%
1990 $66,471 $68,876 ($2,405) -3..5%
1991 $65,243 $67,440 ($2,198) -3..3%
1992 $68,167 $70,917 ($2,750) -3,.9%
1993 $72,865 $71,914 $951 1..3%
1994 $74,805 $72,803 $2,002 2.8%
1995 $79,278 $74,093 $5,184 7.0%
1996 $84,963 $79,518 $5,445 6.8%
1997 $90,347 $82,671 $7,675 9.3%
1998 $92,599 $84,505 $8,094 9.6%
1999 $96,583 $89,634 $6,949 7.8%
2000 $105,859 $100,111 $5,748 5.7%
2001 $92,562 $102,913 ($10,351) -10.1%
2002 884,623 $94,131 ($9,508) -10.1%
2003 $92,498 $95,565 ($3,067) -3.2%
2004 $108,944 $112,183 ($3,238) -2.9%
2005 $117,691 $119,833 ($2,141) -1 .8%
Note: Millions of dollars (nominal)
In contrast to the 1994-1997 period, financial performance of the industry in the 2002- 
2005 period was quite poor. The title of an industry annual report for 2003 captures the general 
mood: Airlines in crisis: The perfect economic storm (ATA, 2003). The report concluded that 
without government intervention, the airlines could lose $13 billion and 98,000 jobs. The year 
2002, in particular, resulted in the worst profit margin ever recorded for the airline industry since 
at least 1971.
The U.S. airline industry was already struggling in 2001, when it suffered a severe shock 
caused by the temporary shutdown of all U.S. air traffic and suppressed demand in the aftermath 
of September 11. There is evidence that the events of September 11, 2001 caused both a 
transitory and ongoing negative demand shift (Ito and Lee, 2004). In terms of share of GDP, the
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industry has not recovered (Hansman, 2005), although passenger demand is high, due to low 
fares (ATA, 2006d). Frequently cited factors contributing to the poor health of the airline industry 
include rapidly rising fuel costs (ATA, 2006d), the war with Iraq, the Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) epidemic, and heavy taxation. However, in its analysis of the impact of 
September 11, 2001, Ito and Lee found that of these factors, only fuel cost had a statistically 
significant impact. To the extent that the Iraq War and SARS affected airline travel, the impact 
was mostly likely focused on international markets, which mostly would not affect this study.
One aspect of the health of the airline industry which may affect the analysis of the 2003 
tax holiday is the large number of carriers that have entered bankruptcy protection. During the 
1994-1997 period, no major carriers were in bankruptcy. During 2002-2005, however, a number 
of carriers operated under bankruptcy protection for at least part of the time. These include, 
among others, Aloha, ATA, Delta, Northwest, United, and US Airways (ATA, 2006c).
Table 4.11 summarizes all cases of a bankruptcy involving a carrier with the largest 
market share on any route in the competitive and concentrated pools. Bankrupt carriers are of 
particular interest to the tax incidence question, as these airlines may enjoy greater flexibility to 
compete aggressively on price as a result of entering bankruptcy protection. It is possible, for 
example, that bankrupt carriers are better able to absorb tax increases than other carriers, in 
which case they may exhibit a tax incidence that is lower than the industry average. This 
hypothesis is explored briefly in the empirical analysis, by examining descriptive statistics for 
routes dominated by bankrupt carriers.
Table 4.11: Airlines in bankruptcy (2002-2005)________________
Code Carrier name Start End
DL Delta Air Lines Inc. 9/14/2005
NW Northwest Airlines Inc. 9/14/2005
TZ ATA Airlines d/b/a ATA 10/26/2004 2/28/2006
UA United Air Lines Inc. 12/9/2002 2/1/2006
US US Airways Inc. 8/11/2002 3/31/2003
US US Airways Inc. 9/12/2004 9/27/2005
Note: Only includes bankruptcies involving the largest carrier on each route analyzed
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CHAPTER V
ESTIMATION RESULTS
The results from the regression analysis are presented below. Unless otherwise specified, 
a Type I error rate of a  = 0.10 is used for all hypothesis testing. If a specific null hypothesis is 
not shown, listed P-values are based on a t-test of the null hypothesis H 0 : /3t = 0 . The number 
of observations is denoted by n . The number of independent variables, including the intercept, is 
denoted by k .
Before continuing, it is worth reviewing what the theoretical framework predicts about the 
empirical results. Under perfect competition, the incidence should fall between zero and one and 
should be identical for both the unit and ad valorem taxes. Under imperfect competition, however, 
the results include the possibility of overshifting. In other words, the incidence of either the unit 
and ad valorem tax can fall in the zero to one range, but can also exceed one. Additionally, 
imperfect competition also allows for the two types of incidence to be different. Specifically, the 
incidence of the unit tax can be expected to exceed that of the ad valorem tax and the ratio 
between the two is an indicator of market power.
Aggregate Estimation
Aggregating at the national levels has several drawbacks. It reduces an extremely rich 
data set to very few observations (for example, 49 million records are reduced to 16 observations 
for the 1994Q1-1997Q4 episode). This low number of observations is in and of itself a problem. It 
provides sufficient degrees of freedom for only a few control variables and can potentially result in 
misleadingly good measures of fit.
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Aggregate estimations for all tickets in the continental U.S. samples were carried out 
using generalized least squares (GLS) weighted by passengers. The sample means and 
standard deviations for both episodes are shown in Table 5.1. The variable names TF and P are 
used interchangeably -  they both refer to the tax inclusive fare. Note that there is no variation in 
the ad valorem rate in the second episode, as shown by the zero standard deviation. Quarterly 
fixed effects are defined by setting a dummy variable equal to one for each quarter except the 
first one (i.e., Q1).
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics: Aggregate estimation_________________________
1994Q1-1997Q4 (n= 16) 2002Q1-2005Q3 (n=15)
Variable Mean Std Dev Variable Mean Std Dev
TF 164.5219 6.3258 TF 166.8639 4.2321
InP 5.1024 0.0385 InP 5.1169 0.0255
FTTRate 0.0786 0.0380 FTTRate 0.0750 0.0000
UnitTax 2.9056 0.5086 UnitTax 12.0784 0.9677
InUnitTax 1.0549 0.1508 InUnitTax 2.4880 0.0880
ATACostlndex 162.0897 4.5056 ATACostlndex 186.0657 4.5049
InATACostlndex 5.0878 0.0277 InATACostlndex 5.2258 0.0240
LCCShare 0.0870 0.0069 LCCShare 0.1564 0.0092
Table 5.2 shows passenger weighted averages of key variables before, during, and after 
the tax shocks. The table also includes total taxes and fees (TTF), i.e., the sum of the ad valorem 
and unit taxes. The definitions of the breaks between the periods are not perfect, because the 
dates of the tax shocks do not always coincide with quarter boundaries. Also, the 1996-1997 
episode consisted of two separate shocks, as discussed in Chapter IV (see Figure 4.1).
For the earlier episode, the total fare clearly decreases as tax collections decline. This is 
followed by an increase once the tax is reinstated. The change in total fare is less than the 
change in total taxes and fees, which indicates, all else being equal, that the tax burden is shared. 
The price after the tax is reinstated is higher than that before the tax lapse. This may in part be 
explained by an increase in the unit tax over time, especially if the unit tax is overshifted, and in 
part by other factors, such as increasing costs.
For the later episode, the results are not as clear. This is not entirely unexpected since 
the variation in taxes is much smaller: The total taxes and fees only change by approximately $2. 
There is practically no observed price change when the tax holiday begins. After the tax shock,
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the price decreases by $3 when the tax is reinstated -  a counterintuitive result. It may mean that 
other exogenous variables must be taken into account in order to estimate the tax incidence 
during the security tax holiday. For example, the drop in total fare after the tax shock may be 
explained by the decline in the ATA cost index. This suggests that estimating the incidence of the 
2003 security tax holiday is more difficult than estimating that of the 1996-1997 tax collection 
lapse.

























The regression results for the first episode are shown in Table 5.3. The primary model for 
this episode is the semilogarithmic specification given by Equation 58. The unit of analysis is the 
quarterly passenger weighted average of the total fare. An alternative fully linear specification is 
also shown, which, as described in Chapter IV, may be a better choice for estimating the tax 
incidence of the unit tax.
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In the primary specification, the coefficients on the ad valorem rate and the unit tax are 
both of the expected sign. Only the former is strictly statistically different from zero, but the 
coefficient on the unit tax is marginally so. The magnitude of the coefficients indicate that the ad 
valorem tax is shared by both airlines and passengers, with the point estimate tending closer to 
one than to zero (especially once the multiplier effect is taken into account). The magnitude of the 
unit tax indicates the possibility that the tax is overshifted -  a possibility which is evaluated more 
carefully later. There are few differences in results between the two functional forms. The linear 
specification has lower standard errors relative to the magnitude of the two coefficients of interest, 
so that both are statistically significant.
Table 5.3: Results: Aggregate estimation (1994Q1-1997Q4)
Dependent variable: InP Dependent variable: TF
Primary specification: semilog Alternate specification: lin-lin
n 16 n 16
k 9 k 9
R2 0.707 R2 0.737
Adj. R2 0.371 Adj. R2 0.436
Coefficient Estimate S.E. P-value Coefficient Estimate S.E. P-value
Intercept 4.807 2.463 0.0920 Intercept 133.697 81.821 0.1463
FTTRate 0.720 0.276 0.0347 FTTRate 119.508 42.653 0.0265
InUnitTax 0.133 0.085 0.1612 UnitTax 6.967 3.655 0.0983
InATACostlndex 0.027 0.484 0.9573 ATACostlndex 0.013 0.461 0.9791
LCCShare -0.055 2.578 0.9834 LCCShare 59.600 407.187 0.8878
Q2 -0.020 0.027 0.4809 Q2 -3.126 4.239 0.4849
Q3 -0.049 0.032 0.1632 Q3 -7.720 4.891 0.1585
Q4 -0.082 0.030 0.0282 Q4 -13.636 4.613 0.0212
Time 0.001 0.005 0.9096 Time 0.005 0.732 0.9948
The cost index and LCC market share have surprisingly little explanatory power. This 
may in part be due to lack of variation: The ATA cost index varies by just over 10% between 
1994Q1and 2005Q3. The LCC market share more than doubles over the same time period, but 
the trend is very gradual. Quarterly dummies are all negative, but only the fourth quarter is 
statistically significant, possibly indicating depressed prices during the low travel months of 
October through December (Thanksgiving and Christmas notwithstanding). The time trend 
variable is not statistically different from zero.
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Table 5.4 shows the results of hypothesis testing. The inferential statistics are derived 
using the primary specification, except for H 0 : /?2 = 1. This hypothesis is evaluated using the
alternate specification, which provides a direct estimate of the tax incidence of the unit tax. The 
tests support the hypothesis that the ad valorem tax incidence is positive and close to one. The 
difference between the incidence on the ad valorem tax and unit tax is not statistically significant. 
The inferential testing is degraded by the large standard errors in the estimates of the unit tax 
coefficients. While the point estimate indicates overshifting, the confidence interval is quite broad, 
as will be shown further below.
Table 5.4: Hypothesis testing: Aggregate estimation (1994Q1-1997Q4)
Coeff. value Ho Hi P-value Outcome
A  = 0.720 A  = o Pi ^  o 0.0347 Reject H0
02 =0.133 A = o P2 0.1612 Do not reject H0
A  = 0.720 A = i Pi ^  1 0.3441 Do not reject H0
P2 =  6.967 A  = i Pi * 1 0.1466 Do not reject H0
(i + r  )A = ~  A 0.2012 Do not reject H0
Table 5.5 lists the regression results for the 2003 security tax holiday. The primary model 
for this episode is the linear specification given by Equation 67. An alternate logarithmic 
specification is used to test for robustness. The coefficient on the unit tax is negative, which is 
unexpected and counter to theory, but it is not statistically different from zero. In fact, with the 
exception of the intercept, no coefficients have P-values close to the Type I error rate of 0.10. The 
fit is poor and the explanatory power of the aggregate model for 2003 security tax holiday is weak. 
These findings vary little in the alternate specification. Compared to the earlier estimation, these 
results are too noisy to be of much value, which emphasizes the need to disaggregate the data.
At best, these results may suggest that the industry experienced some type of structural change 
since the 1990s.
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Table 5.5: Results: Aggregate estimation (2002Q1-2005Q3)
Dependent variable: TF 





Dependent variable: InP 





Coefficient Estimate S.E. P-value Coefficient Estimate S.E. P-value
Intercept 206.323 77.976 0.0331 Intercept 6.619 1.836 0.0087
UnitTax -0.802 1.548 0.6203 InUnitTax -0.055 0.101 0.5992
ATACostlndex -0.245 0.294 0.4322 InATACostlndex -0.279 0.333 0.4311
LCCShare 145.971 296.574 0.6376 LCCShare 0.849 1.777 0.6473
Q2 -0.467 3.411 0.8950 Q2 -0.002 0.021 0.9177
Q3 -4.069 3.153 0.2379 Q3 -0.025 0.019 0.2398
Q4 -3.948 3.330 0.2745 Q4 -0.024 0.020 0.2791
Time -0.628 0.678 0.3854 Time -0.004 0.004 0.3822
Table 5.6 shows results from hypothesis testing for the second episode, confirming that 
there is little to be learned from the aggregate estimation of the security tax holiday. The 
difference between the incidence of the unit tax and either zero or one is not statistically 
significant, although it is close to being so in the latter case. This is expected, given that the point 
estimate of the coefficient is negative.
Table 5.6: Hypothesis testing: Aggregate estimation (2002Q1-2005Q3)
Coeff. value H0 H, P-value Outcome
P2 = -0.802 A = o P2 ± 0 0.6203 Do not reject H0
P2 = -0.802 P2= i Pi ^  1 0.1412 Do not reject H0
Table 5.7 shows estimates of tax incidence from the aggregate analysis. The table also 
shows the estimated value of j j , , the ratio of the incidence of the unit tax to that of the ad valorem
tax. Table 5.8 shows the same results expressed as 90% confidence intervals. The estimate of 
incidence are computed using the regression coefficients from the primary specification, 
evaluated at the passenger weighted averages of price, ad valorem rate, and unit taxes from the 
entire ticket sample. As noted earlier, the tax incidence on the unit tax appears higher than that of 
the ad valorem tax in the earlier episode, which could be an indication of imperfect competition. 
However, the large confidence intervals preclude any statistically significant conclusions along 
those lines and, in fact, incorporate negative values. The incidence of the ad valorem tax is much
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more precisely estimated, however. It is positive and close to one. This is likely the most valuable 
result from the aggregate estimation.
Table 5.7: Estimates of tax incidence: Aggregate estimation____________________
Incidence of Incidence of








Table 5.8: 90% confidence interval of tax incidence: Aggregate estimation
90% confidence interval 90% confidence interval
Period of ad valorem tax of unit tax
1994Q1-1997Q4 0.214 to 1.339 -4.251 to 13.751
2002Q1-2005Q3 -7.453 to 10.549
The point estimate of f l  reported in Table 5.7 indicates the presence of imperfect 
competition. However, recall from the inferential statistics presented in Table 5.4 that the 
difference between two types of tax incidence is not statistically significant, so that it is also 
possible that f i  = 1. As a comparison, values of n  in the European cigarette industry range from 
0.8 to 21.4 for individual country regressions (Delipalla and O’Donnell, 2001, p. 899).
A Breusch-Pagan test on the estimation results failed to detect heteroskedasticity. 
Durbin-Watson tests for autocorrelation resulted in inconclusive findings for both episodes. A 
Breusch-Godfrey test revealed weak evidence for autocorrelation of order one for the 1994-1997 
episode. Stepwise autoregression failed to detect autocorrelation for either episode. Estimation 
with feasible generalized least squares to correct for autocorrelation resulted in only minor 
changes over the GLS results.
As noted earlier, aggregating the data results in a very small number of observations. 
Aggregation also hides certain tax avoidance strategies, such as changes in routings (since the 
specific itinerary affects the unit taxes). It also ignores the possibility that tax incidence is a 
function of market competition, purpose of travel (i.e., business vs. leisure), the bankruptcy status 
of a carrier, and other characteristics. The possibility of varying behavior for different subgroups 
of the observations possibly explains the relatively weak results from the aggregate analysis, 
especially in the second episode.
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The descriptive statistics presented here depict interesting trends. In part they are 
consistent with the GAO’s findings and in part they differ. The regression results are imprecise, 
but improve on the GAO’s analysis in that the underlying data set is much broader and the 
analysis more sophisticated. There is evidence that the incidence is considerably higher than 
zero. In one case, the incidence is significantly different from zero, and in other cases this is 
nearly so. While the analysis of aggregates serves primarily as an opening to restate fundamental 
theoretical questions within an empirical framework, the results provide some insights not 
previously available. However, the aggregate analysis is clearly limited, and serves largely as 
motivation for increasing the sample size and exploring ways to disaggregate the data to more 
meaningfully answer the research questions at hand. This is the rationale for conducting separate 
estimations of competitive and concentrated markets.
Separate Estimations of Competitive and Concentrated Markets
Estimations for the pools of competitive and concentrated markets are carried out using 
GLS. The observations represent route specific averages, so the regression is weighted by the 
number of passengers in each market. Post regression analysis of the GLS estimation using a 
Breusch-Pagan test fails to detect any remaining heteroskedasticity. Additionally the regression is 
clustered by market to produce White standard errors robust to intragroup correlation.
Sample means and standard deviations for both pools are shown in Table 5.9 for the 
1994Q1-1997Q4 episode and in Table 5.10 for the 2002Q1-2005Q3 episode. Dummy variables 
to control for quarterly, yearly, and route fixed effects are not shown. Quarterly fixed effects are 
defined by setting a dummy variable equal to one for each quarter except the first one (i.e., Q1). 
Similarly, year fixed effects are defined by setting a dummy variable equal to one for each year in 
the period, except the first. Route fixed effects are defined by setting a dummy variable to one for 
each route in the pool, except the first route by alphabetical order.
Total fares are lower for the concentrated markets than the competitive markets. This 
may seem counterintuitive, but is a function of market distance as the concentrated markets are 
generally short-haul markets. There is little difference in ETR between the pools in the 1994-1997 
period: 9.9% for the concentrated pool vs. 9.5% for the competitive pool. This is due to the
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dominance of ad valorem taxes. For the 2002-2005 period, there is a more substantial difference. 
The ETR is 16.9% for the concentrated pool and 14.8% for the competitive pool. Unit taxes 
average $3.60 for the competitive pool and $2.29 for the concentrated pool during 1994-1997, 
compared to $13.45 and $9.68, respectively, for 2002-2005.
Table 5.9: Descriptive statistics: Competitive and concentrated pools (1994Q1 -1997Q4)
Competitive (n=320) Concentrated (n=320)
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
TF 192.8108 66.9904 161.7734 67.4855
InP 5.1972 0.3703 4.9773 0.4985
FTTRate 0.0786 0.0368 0.0786 0.0368
UnitTax 3.5968 1.1452 2.2867 0.9962
InUnitTax 1.2291 0.3242 0.6379 0.8510
ATACostlndex 162.0897 4.3694 162.0897 4.3694
InATACostlndex 5.0878 0.0268 5.0878 0.0268
Unempr 0.0619 0.0110 0.0527 0.0093
Table 5.10: Descriptive statistics: Competitive and concentrated pools (2002Q1-2005Q3) 
Competitive (n=300) Concentrated (n=300)
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
TF 176.4699 42.7202 133.2729 65.0742
InP 5.1450 0.2375 4.7879 0.4437
FTTRate 0.0750 0.0000 0.0750 0.0000
UnitTax 13.4534 3.1110 9.6832 1.1937
InUnitTax 2.5709 0.2431 2.2624 0.1289
ATACostlndex 186.0657 4.3594 186.0657 4.3594
InATACostlndex 5.2258 0.0232 5.2258 0.0232
Unempr 0.0582 0.0065 0.0564 0.0075
Table 5.11 shows the 1994Q1-1997Q4 passenger weighted averages for both the 
competitive and concentrated markets before, during, and after the tax shocks. Table 5.12 shows 
the same for 2002Q1-2005Q3. For the earlier episode it can be seen that prices go down during 
the tax shock and climb back up afterwards. This is similar to the descriptive statistics generated 
for the aggregate data (see Table 5.2). However, in this case the change in total fare appears to 
exceed the change in total taxes and fees (TTF) in both directions. This could indicate 
overshifting or be explained by other exogenous factors particular to the competitive markets.
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Table 5.11: Weighted averages: Before, during, and after tax shock (1994Q1-1997Q4) 
Competitive Concentrated





















Table 5.12: Weighted averages: Before, during, and after tax shock (2002Q1-2005Q3)
Competitive Concentrated
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In the concentrated pool, tax inclusive prices increase during the decrease in taxes. This 
result is counter to theory, unless explained by other factors. It is however, consistent by with 
some of the findings documented by the GAO (2004). This may indicate that carriers which 
dominate a market are able to respond to a tax change differently than other carriers. Hence, the 
method developed here to determine market concentration through an estimate of the lower and 
upper bounds of HHI seems in fact to have identified two types of markets with different behavior.
For the 2003 security tax holiday, fares in the competitive markets drop when the tax 
decreases, as expected, but by ari amount somewhat larger than the change in taxes. However, 
similar to what is found in the aggregate analysis, fares also drop when the security tax is 
reinstated. This result may in part be explained by the decrease in costs, as shown by the drop in 
the ATA cost index. In the concentrated markets, the that fares increase as the tax drops. Again, 
this may support the hypothesis that carriers in dominant markets react to tax changes differently. 
However, it could also be explained by increases in costs or the combination of low levels of 
variation and other unexplained factors.
Table 5.13: Weighted averages of markets where dominant carrier is bankrupt
Competitive Concentrated
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During the 2002Q1-2005Q3 episode there were a number of legacy carriers operating in 
bankruptcy protection (see Table 4.11). In order to conduct a preliminary evaluation of whether 
these carriers behave differently when facing tax changes, passenger weighted averages are 
provided in Table 5.13 for the subset of markets in which a bankrupt carrier is the dominant 
carrier. Out of the twenty competitive markets, eight are dominated by bankrupt carriers, 
compared to six out of twenty for the concentrated markets.
In the competitive markets, the results are not substantially different than those observed 
for the overall pool. This is not surprising, since the bankrupt carriers generally have a lower 
market share in these markets compared to the concentrated markets. This may mask 
differences in price competition between bankrupt and other carriers. In the concentrated markets, 
however, the bankrupt carriers have larger market share. Here, increase when the tax drops and 
prices decrease when the security tax is reintroduced. Compared to the results for all 
concentrated markets, the price changes are much larger. These results are difficult to interpret, 
but suggest that routes where large market shares are held by bankrupt carriers differ from other 
markets. Since this possibility is not explicitly controlled for in the regression model, a more 
rigorous analysis of the impact of bankrupt carriers is an area where future research is warranted.
The regression results for the first episode are shown in Table 5.14. The primary model 
used for this period is the semilogarithmic specification given by Equation 59. An alternative fully 
linear specification is shown in Table 5.15. The coefficients on the ad valorem tax rate and unit 
tax are of the expected sign, but only the former is statistically significant. This is true for both the 
primary and alternate specifications. The general result, again, is that the point estimates for ad 
valorem taxation is close to one. The tax incidence for unit taxation indicates overshifting.
However, similar to the aggregate estimation, the standard errors on the coefficients on unit 
taxation are relatively large, resulting in large confidence intervals. The point estimate on unit 
taxes in the concentrated pool is considerably lower than that in the competitive pool and is in fact 
below one (again, with a wide confidence intervals, however).
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Table 5.14: Results (semilog): Competitive and concentrated pools (1994Q1-1997Q4)
Competitive markets
Dependent variable: InP 






Dependent variable: InP 





Coefficient Estimate S.E. P-value Coefficient Estimate S.E. P-value
Intercept 3.020 2.890 0.3092 Intercept 11.029 3.014 0.0017
FTTRate 0.865 0.253 0.0029 FTTRate 0.613 0.186 0.0038
InUnitTax 0.091 0.070 0.2082 InUnitTax 0.009 0.010 0.3866
InATACostlndex 0.325 0.565 0.5714 InATACostlndex -1.307 0.609 0.0452
Unempr 3.683 5.287 0.4944 Unempr 11.106 6.705 0.1141
Q2 -0.020 0.019 0.2978 Q2 -0.054 0.036 0.1467
Q3 -0.080 0.030 0.0143 Q3 -0.085 0.053 0.1243
Q4 -0.069 0.034 0.0555 Q4 -0.031 0.039 0.4388
Y1995 -0.037 0.067 0.5883 Y1995 -0.009 0.100 0.9314
Y1996 -0.107 0.092 0.2588 Y1996 0.201 0.082 0.0240
Y1997 -0.061 0.118 0.6119 Y1997 0.341 0.127 0.0146
BDLSFO 0.748 0.073 <.0001 ATLCVG 0.360 0.004 <.0001
BOSMSY 0.262 0.029 <.0001 ATLDAY 0.130 0.009 <.0001
BOSSAN 0.583 0.053 <.0001 ATLRIC 0.309 0.023 <.0001
BWISAN 0.262 0.055 0.0001 AUSELP -0.652 0.073 <.0001
CLEORD -0.572 0.041 <.0001 AUSLBB -0.882 0.069 <.0001
CMHTPA -0.333 0.033 <.0001 BDLPHL 0.186 0.046 0.0007
COSIAD 0.252 0.098 0.0191 BHMMSY -0.980 0.056 <.0001
EWRSEA 0.716 0.003 <.0001 BOSPHL -0.238 0.038 <.0001
FLLLAX 0.366 0.072 <.0001 BOSPIT 0.074 0.040 0.0806
FLLLGA -0.055 0.030 0.0810 BOSROC -0.120 0.083 0.1643
LASORD 0.110 0.035 0.0051 CLTPHL 0.305 0.019 <.0001
LAXMCI -0.062 0.080 0.4492 DCAPVD 0.062 0.030 0.0557
LAXMKE 0.300 0.057 <.0001 DTWMKE 0.142 0.016 <.0001
LAXMSY 0.240 0.089 0.0144 DTWMSP 0.597 0.018 <.0001
LGAPBI -0.028 0.025 0.2648 INDPHL 0.271 0.013 <.0001
MCOSEA 0.418 0.029 <.0001 MCIOKC -0.965 0.019 <.0001
MCOSFO 0.548 0.064 <.0001 MKEMSP 0.113 0.076 0.1539
ORDPHX 0.250 0.039 <.0001 PHLPIT -0.286 0.055 <.0001
PHXSEA -0.089 0.029 0.0055 SANSMF -1.317 0.178 <.0001
The ATA cost index and market unemployment rate have little explanatory power in the 
competitive pool. The coefficient on the cost index is negative in the concentrated pool, and 
statistically significant. This may be an indication of some level of detachment between price and 
costs in markets where air carriers enjoy a high level of dominance, but is otherwise a 
counterintuitive result. It could also suggest one or more omitted variables. Some of the price
77
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
changes observed here are likely due to factors not fully captured in the model. Correlation 
between an omitted variable and the ATA cost index, could possibly explain the observed results.
Table 5.15: Results (lin-lin): Competitive and concentrated pools (1994Q1-1997Q4)
Competitive markets
Dependent variable: TF 






Dependent variable: TF 





Coefficient Estimate S.E. P-value Coefficient Estimate S.E. P-value
Intercept 22.779 87.274 0.7969 Intercept 205.533 83.718 0.0239
FTTRate 136.253 35.603 0.0011 FTTRate 91.449 28.739 0.0049
UnitTax 5.528 3.431 0.1236 UnitTax 0.801 2.370 0.7391
ATACostlndex 0.421 0.426 0.3349 ATACostlndex -1.183 0.520 0.0346
Unempr 668.150 703.498 0.3542 Unempr 2428.036 1044.050 0.0313
Q2 -4.182 2.896 0.1651 Q2 -6.784 4.100 0.1144
Q3 -13.899 4.256 0.0041 Q3 -9.839 6.181 0.1279
Q4 -12.959 5.209 0.0223 Q4 -2.012 5.652 0.7258
Y1995 -7.856 10.176 0.4496 Y1995 7.011 13.315 0.6046
Y1996 -17.567 12.306 0.1697 Y1996 37.389 12.871 0.0091
Y1997 -12.535 14.158 0.3870 Y1997 62.444 19.901 0.0054
BDLSFO 169.377 10.143 <.0001 ATLCVG 65.675 0.716 <.0001
BOSMSY 44.955 3.511 <.0001 ATLDAY 18.545 1.008 <.0001
BOSSAN 121.274 7.270 <.0001 ATLRIC 55.896 3.522 <.0001
BWISAN 46.080 7.313 <.0001 AUSELP -95.698 11.284 <.0001
CLEORD -56.577 6.403 <.0001 AUSLBB -115.472 11.900 <.0001
CMHTPA -34.570 5.010 <.0001 BDLPHL 29.087 7.969 0.0017
COSIAD 43.605 13.158 0.0036 BHMMSY -117.448 8.653 <.0001
EWRSEA 156.168 0.823 <.0001 BOSPHL -40.007 7.257 <.0001
FLLLAX 68.067 10.383 <.0001 BOSPIT 6.798 6.277 0.2924
FLLLGA -4.195 5.590 0.4622 BOSROC -30.623 12.931 0.0286
LASORD 21.047 5.571 0.0013 CLTPHL 55.399 3.010 <.0001
LAXMCI -4.844 11.456 0.6772 DCAPVD 9.534 5.104 0.0773
LAXMKE 54.481 8.365 <.0001 DTWMKE 27.512 2.772 <.0001
LAXMSY 42.879 12.397 0.0026 DTWMSP 124.686 4.154 <.0001
LGAPBI -0.863 5.031 0.8657 INDPHL 48.536 4.968 <.0001
MCOSEA 77.647 4.022 <.0001 MCIOKC -97.885 3.545 <.0001
MCOSFO 110.004 9.375 <.0001 MKEMSP 25.326 11.389 0.0385
ORDPHX 44.937 7.074 <.0001 PHLPIT -49.143 8.477 <.0001
PHXSEA -7.280 5.867 0.2298 SANSMF -170.814 28.143 <.0001
Quarter fixed effects are negative, but vary in significance. They indicate fares are lowest 
in the third quarter, which may be consistent with late summer fare wars. Year fixed effects vary 
in sign and significance, but generally indicate no time trend in the competitive markets compared
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to some evidence for price increases over time in the concentrated markets. This may suggest 
that airlines have more pricing power in markets where they dominate. Route fixed effects are 
almost all statistically significant in both pools, demonstrating that there are strong unobserved 
effects specific to the selected routes. One of these is likely to be the impact of route distance, 
which is not otherwise controlled for. The regression is generally robust to model specification.
Results from hypothesis testing for the 1994-1997 episode are shown in Table 5.16. 
Except for the hypothesis H 0 : f t  - 1, all inferential testing is based on the primary model
specification. Hypothesis testing comparing the competitive and concentrated pools is conducted 
separately and is discussed later (see Table 5.22).




ft, = 0.865 f t  = 0 f t 0.0029 Reject H0
f t 2 =  0.091 f t = 0 f t 2 ^ 0 0.2082 Do not reject H0
ft, = 0.865 f t = l f t  ^  1 0.5935 Do not reject H0
f t 2 = 5.528 A  = i 02 ^  1 0.1880 Do not reject H0
(l + r)/?, = £ - ■ft 0.3137 Do not reject H0
Concentrated markets
Coeff. value H0 Hi P-value Outcome
ft, =0 .613 f t = 0 f t 0.0038 Reject H0
f t 2 = 0.009 f t  = o f t2 ^  0 0.3866 Do not reject H0
f t  =0 .613 A  = i Pi ^  1 0.0384 Reject H0
f t  = 0.801 A  = i f t2 ^  1 0.9331 Do not reject H0
M+ ■02 {\ + t)0 0.8407 Do not reject H0
The regression results for the second episode are shown in Table 5.17. The primary 
model is the linear specification given by Equation 68, with an alternative logarithmic specification 
shown in Table 5.18.
The estimation results from the second episode provide the strongest indication yet of 
overshifting of the unit tax. The coefficient in the concentrated pool is clearly statistically different 
from zero, and in the competitive pool it is nearly so. The point estimates are close to five.
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Table 5.17: Results (lin-lin): Competitive and concentrated pools (2002Q1-2005Q3)
Competitive markets
Dependent variable: TF 






Dependent variable: TF 





Coefficient Estimate S.E. P-value Coefficient Estimate S.E. P-value
Intercept 74.802 104.065 0.4810 Intercept -7.996 116.121 0.9458
UnitTax 4.997 2.910 0.1022 UnitTax 4.883 2.109 0.0319
ATACostlndex -0.276 0.446 0.5434 ATACostlndex 0.812 0.547 0.1545
Unempr 1348.742 1290.311 0.3090 Unempr -1302.593 858.569 0.1457
Q2 -4.807 4.013 0.2457 Q2 -6.095 3.991 0.1432
Q3 -9.250 5.065 0.0836 Q3 -4.962 2.587 0.0702
Q4 -10.966 6.492 0.1075 Q4 -10.794 4.665 0.0320
Y2003 2.308 5.853 0.6977 Y2003 15.406 5.782 0.0153
Y2004 -17.216 17.415 0.3353 Y2004 7.412 10.149 0.4741
Y2005 1.506 21.759 0.9455 Y2005 -13.295 11.457 0.2603
BOSLAX 97.498 26.958 0.0018 ATLCVG 106.743 5.234 <.0001
BOSPHX 42.972 8.870 0.0001 ATLRIC 66.485 6.283 <.0001
DENMCO 34.701 14.416 0.0264 BHMMSY -35.665 2.445 <.0001
DFWSLC 64.444 22.339 0.0095 BNAMSY -27.029 4.117 <.0001
EWRLAX 104.088 29.044 0.0020 BNARDU -11.598 4.630 0.0215
EWRORD 41.123 29.193 0.1751 BOSPIT 122.979 1.885 <.0001
FLLMCI -37.890 3.030 <.0001 BOSRSW 9.251 3.666 0.0207
INDSEA -22.185 11.322 0.0649 DFWSTL 60.307 7.187 <.0001
JAXMDW -21.300 11.310 0.0750 ELPPHX -36.143 6.282 <.0001
JFKTPA -18.452 25.208 0.4731 ELPSAT 14.813 7.507 0.0632
LAXMCO 51.996 24.975 0.0511 LASRNO -40.267 2.822 0.0000
LAXPVD 6.187 16.047 0.7041 MCIMSP 132.819 2.101 <.0001
LGAMSY -11.045 20.733 0.6004 MCIOKC -35.482 1.945 <.0001
LGARDU 3.052 32.031 0.9251 MSYTPA -25.735 3.013 <.0001
MCIPDX -10.360 18.067 0.5731 PDXRNO -28.391 10.863 0.0171
MCISEA -3.622 15.898 0.8222 PDXSEA 37.810 14.733 0.0189
MKESFO 7.385 17.245 0.6733 PHLPIT 61.883 2.190 0.0000
ORDTPA -4.479 21.574 0.8377 SANSMF -19.284 9.591 0.0588
PVDSAN 7.025 17.437 0.6915 SANTUS -29.881 8.362 0.0020
The coefficients on the ATA cost index and market unemployment rate are of the 
expected signs only for the concentrated pool, but are not significant in either pool. Coefficients 
on quarter dummy variables are negative, but generally not significant. They indicate highest 
prices in the first quarter and lowest in the fourth quarter, which is unexpected. Year fixed effects 
are not significant and indicate no clear time trend for the four years studied. The exception is a
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sharp price increase in 2003 in the concentrated pool. This may indicate an ability to restore 
revenue in non-competitive markets after the difficult years of 2001 and 2002. Route fixed affects 
are generally not significant in the competitive pool, but significant in the concentrated pool. The 
estimation appears robust to functional specification, with few differences between the two 
specifications.
Table 5.18: Results (log-log): Competitive and concentrated pools (2002Q1-2005Q3)
Competitive markets
Dependent variable: InP 






Dependent variable: InP 





Coefficient Estimate S.E. 3-value Coefficient Estimate S.E. P-value
Intercept 4.415 3.264 0.1921 Intercept -1.083 4.053 0.7921
InUnitTax 0.381 0.233 0.1183 InUnitTax 0.305 0.136 0.0372
InATACostlndex -0.168 0.518 0.7497 InATACostlndex 1.082 0.761 0.1713
Unempr 10.185 5.621 0.0858 Unempr -9.098 4.799 0.0733
Q2 -0.022 0.019 0.2593 Q2 -0.034 0.029 0.2508
Q3 -0.038 0.024 0.1332 Q3 -0.028 0.021 0.1950
Q4 -0.048 0.026 0.0739 Q4 -0.058 0.029 0.0632
Y2003 0.029 0.043 0.5058 Y2003 0.109 0.032 0.0027
Y2004 -0.052 0.077 0.5044 Y2004 0.056 0.055 0.3183
Y2005 0.059 0.090 0.5244 Y2005 -0.068 0.059 0.2644
BOSLAX 0.434 0.114 0.0012 ATLCVG 0.627 0.033 <.0001
BOSPHX 0.216 0.036 <.0001 ATLRIC 0.411 0.035 <.0001
DENMCO 0.190 0.078 0.0243 BHMMSY -0.381 0.013 <.0001
DFWSLC 0.305 0.093 0.0040 BNAMSY -0.275 0.024 <.0001
EWRLAX 0.492 0.134 0.0016 BNARDU -0.128 0.024 <.0001
EWRORD 0.227 0.148 0.1415 BOSPIT 0.710 0.012 <.0001
FLLMCI -0.271 0.014 <.0001 BOSRSW 0.079 0.019 0.0007
INDSEA -0.145 0.060 0.0266 DFWSTL 0.413 0.044 <.0001
JAXMDW -0.160 0.047 0.0028 ELPPHX -0.436 0.034 <.0001
JFKTPA -0.185 0.141 0.2069 ELPSAT 0.103 0.040 0.0178
LAXMCO 0.260 0.114 0.0341 LASRNO -0.402 0.017 <.0001
LAXPVD 0.005 0.072 0.9449 MCIMSP 0.736 0.011 <.0001
LGAMSY -0.109 0.086 0.2211 MCIOKC -0.383 0.013 <.0001
LGARDU -0.026 0.174 0.8824 MSYTPA -0.212 0.018 <.0001
MCIPDX -0.095 0.075 0.2196 PDXRNO -0.320 0.064 <.0001
MCISEA -0.050 0.067 0.4596 PDXSEA 0.278 0.084 0.0036
MKESFO 0.010 0.072 0.8941 PHLPIT 0.331 0.013 <.0001
ORDTPA -0.076 0.107 0.4833 SANSMF -0.227 0.054 0.0005
PVDSAN 0.009 0.076 0.9062 SANTUS -0.357 0.047 <.0001
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Results from hypothesis testing for the 2003 security tax holiday are shown in Table 5.19. 
All inferential testing for this episode is based on the primary model specification. In the 
concentrated markets, the estimate of the incidence of the unit tax is now sufficiently precise to 
reject the hypothesis that it is equal to zero. This also nearly the case in the competitive markets. 
Relatively speaking, the standard errors of the coefficients on the unit tax are smaller for this 
estimation than those obtained in the aggregate estimations. The same holds when comparing 
the estimation of price effects related to the unit tax for this period with the estimation of the 
competitive and concentrated pools for the earlier period. The hypothesis that the incidence of the 
unit tax is equal to one is rejected in the concentrated markets, and is somewhat close to being 
rejected in the competitive markets. This is the strongest evidence yet of overshifting of the unit 
tax, given that the point estimates are close to five.




f t  =4 .997 A = o Pi 0.1022 Do not reject H0
f t  =4 .997 A  = i Pi ^  1 0.1708 Do not reject H0
Concentrated markets
Coeff. value H0 Hi P-value Outcome
($2 =  4.883 o /?2 ^  0 0.0319 Reject H0
P2 = 4.883 A  = i Pi ^  1 0.0667 Reject H0
Table 5.20 shows estimates of tax incidence from the analysis of the competitive and 
concentrated pools, as well as estimates of , the ratio of the incidence of the unit tax to the
incidence of the ad valorem tax. Table 5.21 shows 90% confidence intervals for both types of tax 
incidence.
The incidence estimates for the ad valorem tax mostly fall between zero and one 
(generally closer to one). This is consistent with the findings in the aggregate estimation. In most 
cases, the incidence on the unit tax appears to be higher, although the confidence intervals are 
wide. With one exception, the point estimates of the incidence of the unit tax are in the 4-5 range. 
The exception is the estimated unit tax incidence for the concentrated markets during the
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1994Q1-1997Q4 period. This could be explained by the asymmetric tax incidence documented by 
the GAO (2004). However, it could also be a result of the relatively large standard errors.
Table 5.20: Estimates of tax incidence: Competitive and concentrated pools
Period
Competitive markets 
Incidence of Incidence of 
ad valorem tax S.E. unit tax S.E.
1994Q1-1997Q4 0.932 0.2726 4.601 3.5318 4.938
2002Q1-2005Q3 4.997 2.9102
Concentrated markets
Incidence of Incidence of
Period ad valorem tax S.E. unit tax S.E. M
1994Q1-1997Q4 0.661 0.2003 0.542 0.6115 0.820
2002Q1-2005Q3 4.883 2.1089
Table 5.21: 90% confidence interval of tax incidence: Competitive and concentrated pools
Competitive markets
90% confidence interval 90% confidence interval
Period of ad valorem tax of unit tax
1994Q1-1997Q4 0.482 to 1.382 -2.296 to 9.359
2002Q1-2005Q3 -1.892 to 7.712
Concentrated markets
90% confidence interval 90% confidence interval
Period of ad valorem tax of unit tax
1994Q1-1997Q4 0.330 to 0.991 -5.216 to 6.439
2002Q1-2005Q3 -2.693 to 6.911
The value of / /  is approximately five in the competitive markets and just under one in the 
concentrated markets. The former result would indicate the presence of imperfect competition, 
similar to the finding of the aggregate estimation. The latter result would indicate perfect 
competition, which is an unexpected result, especially as it is derived from a concentrated pool. 
This means either that the analytical framework which holds that f i  is a measure of market 
power is not holding or that the estimates of i i  are too imprecise. The estimates have wide
confidence intervals: In no case is the difference between the two types of tax incidence used to 
compute n  significantly different from zero.
In order to test whether tax incidence behaves differently across the competitive and 
concentrated markets, a two sample t-test is conducted on the results of the primary specification 
for each of the two episodes. The results of this test are shown in Table 5.22. For both episodes,
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the hypothesis that the incidence differs between the two pools is not supported for either type of 
tax incidence.




A.ot„ =0 .865  
=0 .613
ft \,c o m p  ,conc l.i omp ^  f i\,c o n c 0.4238 Do not reject H0
A ™ *  = 0.091 
= 0.009






$ 2 , comp cone @ 2,comp ^  P 2,conc 0.9748 Do not reject H0
Overall, the coefficients between the competitive and concentrated pools are remarkably 
close in value. There is no evidence that the tax incidence differs across level of competition at 
the route level. One possible conclusion is that the goal of disaggregating the nationwide results 
by studying competitive and concentrated markets has not been as effective as hoped. The 
implication for future research is both to increase the size of the pools, in order to reduce 
standard errors, and to look at other means of disaggregation. Possibilities include analyzing 
business vs. leisure fares or performing carrier specific analyses. An alternate conclusion is that 
there may be no reason to expect the pricing behavior to be different across the two pools. The 
airlines’ revenue management techniques may not differentiate between these pools of markets 
or their objectives may be the same for both types.
Asymmetric Response to Direction of Tax Change
One of the GAO’s findings was that the incidence may differ according to the direction of 
the tax change. When the tax reduction went into effect, the resulting incidence on the consumer 
was found to be essentially zero, whereas when the tax reinstated, it was found to be near one. In 
order to explore this hypothesis, the time series for the second episode is divided into two sub­
periods: 2002Q2-2003Q3 and 2003Q3-2005Q4. The first sub-period captures all the decreases in
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the federal security service fee; the second sub-period captures all the increases. This pooling of 
the data is not perfect, as one period, 2003Q3, is shared by both data sets. Due to the granularity 
of the data, however, this is inevitable. No attempt is made to correct for this cross-correlation 
between the pools, so the following results should be viewed as indicative at best.
For this analysis, the 2002-2005 period is selected over the 1994-1997 period. The 
second period consisted of two separate shocks (see Figure 4.1), which makes it difficult to 
clearly identify the direction of the tax change. Also, the GAO’s analysis of the 2003 security tax 
holiday was more rigorous, with over 100 major routes included. For the 1996-1997 tax lapse, 
only a qualitative analysis of thirteen hand-picked markets was conducted.
The regression uses GLS, weighted by the number of passengers. Only the primary
linear specification is shown. Table 5.23 shows the results: Only /?2 is reported, the coefficient on 
the unit tax.
Table 5.23: Results: Asymmetric tax incidence________________________
Competitive markets
Episode n Adj. R2 S.E. P-value
FSSF decrease 
FSSF increase







Episode n Adj. R2 /?2 S.E. P-value
FSSF decrease 
FSSF increase






The coefficients are significantly different from zero in all but the first case, and even 
there the P-value of 0.19 is marginally close to the Type I error rate of 0.10. For the competitive 
markets, differences in standard errors are primarily driven by the different sizes of the sub­
samples. In the concentrated pool, however, the standard error is higher for the period when the 
security fee increases, despite a higher number of observations. In that case, the higher statistical 
significance is driven by the coefficient and not the sample size.
To test the GAO’s findings of asymmetric incidence, tests are performed on the null
hypothesis H 0 : f i 1Mcnase > P 2,decrease ■ The results °f are shown in Table 5.24. In the competitive 
markets, the estimates of the tax incidence are very close. In the concentrated markets, the
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estimate of the tax incidence is in fact higher when the tax increases than when it decreases. 
However, in neither case is the difference statistically significant.
Parts of the GAO’s findings imply that the coefficients might have opposite signs, and in 
particular that the coefficients during the decrease might be negative. There is some agreement 
between the GAO’s findings and the descriptive statistics presented previously. However, the 
findings do not hold up in an empirical analysis which incorporates controls for other factors, 
which the GAO clearly states are absent in its analysis. The results presented here, although still 
limited, do not detect the presence of an asymmetric response.
Table 5.24: Hypothesis testing: Asymmetric tax incidence_________________________________
Competitive markets
H0 H-i P-value Outcome
$ 2 , decrease 
f t 2 , increase
=  3 .6 9 7  
=  3 .4 9 9
ft2,decrease ~  f t 2 , increase f t 2 , decrease ^  f t 2 ^increase 0.5239 Do not reject
Concentrated markets
Ho H, P-value Outcome
f t 2 ,  decrease 
f t 2, increase
=  5 .4 9 4  
=  7 .3 1 9
ft2,decrease ^  P 2 ,increase f t 2 , decrease <  P l „ e 0.3416 Do not reject
Aim, Sennoga, and Skidmore also explore the possibility of asymmetric price response to 
tax changes in their study on tax incidence in the retail gasoline market. This part of their work is 
motivated by previous findings in the literature which indicate that gasoline retail prices respond 
asymmetrically to wholesale prices (Aim, Sennoga, and Skidmore, 2005, p. 15). However, they 
find no statistical evidence for an asymmetric response to tax changes, but are able to confirm 
that consumer prices react more quickly to increases in wholesale prices than to decreases (Aim, 
Sennoga, and Skidmore, 2005, p. 16).
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
This study represents an initial exploration of tax incidence in the airline industry, a topic 
not previously analyzed in the economic literature. The large DB1B origin destination survey is 
used to compute average fare information for U.S. domestic air travel. The DB1B database 
reports tax inclusive fares. Ticket taxes and fees are retroactively computed based on the fare 
and itinerary of each ticket. The effective tax rate for each ticket is also computed.
An econometric analysis is conducted at the aggregate level and for two subsets of the 
data, one pool of heavily contested routes and another of heavily dominated routes. The analysis 
covers two episodes when the U.S. ticket tax structure was subjected to relatively large and 
sudden reductions in taxes. The first episode consists of the periods January 1-August 26,1996 
and January 1-March 6,1997. During these dates, the federal government’s authority to collect 
the ticket taxes lapsed as a side effect of congressional negotiations on reforming the ticket tax 
structure. At that time, the federal ticket tax consisted solely of an ad valorem tax. The second 
episode lasted from June 1 to September 30, 2003, when the federal security fee was suspended 
as part of a financial relief package for the airline industry. Longitudinally, the data sets each 
cover four years, approximately centered on the tax shock.
Reduced form multivariate regression is used to estimate the effect of variations in the ad 
valorem tax rate and unit taxes on the tax inclusive fare. Additional independent variables are 
used to control for exogenous demand and supply shifters, including an airline cost index and 
seasonally adjusted unemployment rates for each city-pair. The aggregate regression also 
includes controls for quarter fixed effects, overall time trend, and the market share held by low- 
cost carriers. Market concentration is controlled for by creating pools of twenty competitive and 
concentrated markets, respectively. Markets are allocated to the pools by estimating lower and 
upper bounds on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. The regression analyses of these pools are 
also controlled for year, quarter, and route fixed effects.
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Several challenges exist to conducting an empirical analysis of tax incidence in the air 
transportation industry. First, the ad valorem tax has a multiplier effect: Any increase in taxes 
results in an even higher increase in consumer price, since part of the change is collected as 
additional tax revenue. Second, the price effects of unit taxes and ad valorem taxes are 
functionally linked, potentially in non-linear ways. Third, the history of the structure and levels of 
U.S. ticket taxes and fees excludes the possibility of a natural experiment and lacks substantial 
simultaneous variations in ad valorem and unit taxes. Fourth, the airline industry is an oligopoly, 
but is not clearly categorized by any of the standard analytical models of imperfect competition. 
This complicates the transition from theory to empirical analysis. Finally, there are a number of 
political and institutional details affecting taxation in the airline industry, which are not captured by 
current theory. These constitute a particular challenge, especially in analyzing air transportation 
economics in the post-2001 environment.
Summary of Conclusions
The tax incidence of the ad valorem tax generally falls between zero and one, indicating 
that the burden is shared between consumers and producers. The estimates are closer to one 
than to zero, indicating that consumers may carry more of the burden. This is particularly true in 
competitive markets. This may mimic the theoretical result of a tax incidence of unity in the long 
run framework of free entry and exit under perfect competition. In conclusion, the empirical 
estimates of the incidence of the ad valorem tax do not fall outside the bounds of predicted by 
economic theory. The best available, prior theoretical estimates place the incidence in the range 
of 0.3 to 0.5 under perfect competition. The results of this study indicate that such values are at 
the low end of empirically derived confidence intervals.
It should be kept in mind that the data used for the analysis of the ad valorem tax is 
approximately ten years old. This may limit the potential of generalizing the results obtained here. 
The 2003 episode only featured variation in the unit taxes and is therefore unable to contribute to 
an updated understanding of the incidence of the ad valorem tax.
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In the case of unit taxes, the incidence generally appears to be higher. However, the 
estimates are imprecise, to the point where the possibility of negative values cannot be excluded. 
The historical variation in unit taxes is much smaller than that of the ad valorem tax, which makes 
it more difficult to determine the price impact of tax changes. At best, it can be concluded that 
there is weak evidence that the unit tax has a higher incidence than the ad valorem tax. This 
would imply overshifting of the unit tax onto the consumer and could also indicate the presence of 
imperfect competition.
The principal airline trade organization in the U.S., the Air Transport Association, has 
clearly stated that taxation is high priority concern for the industry. ATA asserts that the industry’s 
lack of pricing power prevents it from passing on tax increases to passengers. This is equivalent 
to a hypothesis that the incidence is equal to zero, so that the producer bears the full tax burden. 
Provided that the analysis of historical tax shocks presented in this study can be generalized to 
tax changes in the current economic environment, then this hypothesis can be rejected. There is 
considerable historical evidence that a significant portion of ticket taxes and fees are borne by 
passengers.
Note that in the 1994-1997 period there is very little variation in the unit taxes, which is 
one reason why the estimates of incidence on unit taxes are imprecise for that episode. What 
little variation exists comes from changes in PFC collections, as well as the introduction of the 
segment tax towards the end of the period. Nominally, the point estimates of the tax incidence of 
the ad valorem tax and that of the unit tax show large differences. In particular, the tax incidence 
of the unit tax appears to be higher in the competitive markets. However, these differences are 
not statistically significant.
In the 2002-2005 period there is considerably more variation in the unit tax, primarily as a 
result of the 2003 security tax holiday. For concentrated markets, the estimate of the incidence of 
the unit tax is statistically significant from zero, and in the competitive market it is nearly so. The 
point estimates are in the range of four to five, indicating the possibility of overshifting of the unit 
tax. In this episode there is no variation in the ad valorem tax rate, preventing a comparison of the 
two types of tax incidence.
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The lack of simultaneous variation in both the ad valorem rate and the unit tax degrades 
the ability to conduct a study of market power in the airline industry based on an analysis of tax 
incidence. If the two types of tax incidence can be assumed to be consistent over time, then the 
incidence of the unit tax from the second period can be compared to that of the ad valorem tax 
from the first period, which would provide some evidence in support of imperfect competition. The 
benefit of this approach is that it takes advantage of the specific periods which saw the highest 
variation in unit and ad valorem taxes, respectively. However, a comparison across time is 
problematic, as substantial structural changes have taken place in the airline industry over the 
course of time included in this analysis.
In its 2004 report on ticket taxes, the GAO found evidence that the burden lies on the 
producer when the tax goes down, but shifts to the consumer when the tax goes up. This study is 
unable to find evidence for this phenomenon, which is excluded by the analytical framework 
incorporated here. This does not necessarily mean that the GAO’s finding is incorrect. It may 
simply reflect the difference in granularity of the data (weekly vs. quarterly changes) or a failure of 
the theoretical framework to adequately explain this outcome.
Various functional forms are evaluated in this study. With few exceptions, the estimates 
are found to be robust to different model specifications. However, each specification represents a 
compromise, as the tax incidence of the ad valorem tax and that of the unit taxes cannot be 
directly estimated simultaneously. There are two basic options: One is to directly estimate the 
incidence of the ad valorem tax, in which case one can only obtain an elasticity estimate for the 
unit tax. The second is to directly estimate the incidence of the unit tax, in which case the tax 
incidence of the ad valorem tax must be scaled by the tax inclusive price, which serves as the 
dependent variable. The ad valorem tax incidence also includes a non-linear multiplier effect. 
Further, theory shows that the taxes are linked, which is not accounted for in the empirical 
framework.
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Because of the limitations inherent to empirical models of a joint policy of ad valorem and 
unit taxes, the estimated coefficients on the taxes are biased. For example, the absence of the 
multiplier effect tends to bias the coefficient on the ad valorem rate downwards. Other 
researchers convert the ad valorem tax to a unit tax, which introduces price on the right hand side. 
This does not eliminate bias as it raises potential endogeneity concerns.
The control variables introduced in the regressions add surprisingly little explanatory 
power, with the exception of quarter and route fixed effects. This makes it difficult to isolate to 
what extent fare changes are causally related to the observed changes in ticket tax rates and 
levels. The lack of a natural experiment poses considerable challenges to estimating the 
incidence of airline ticket taxes and fees. The lack of a control group makes it particularly difficult 
to isolate the impact of events which are contemporaneous with tax changes.
Directions for Further Research
In the end, it is possible that all the current results indicate is that taxes are split between 
airlines and customers. There may be too many unobserved factors to obtain estimates which 
would allow for other conclusions. Also, the disaggregation of the data may not be sufficient or of 
the correct form to generate more specific results. The weak statistical significance of exogenous 
control variables indicates a need for an improved fare model. The intent would be to better 
isolate the impact of exogenous factors and to more accurately model price competition in the 
industry. In particular, more sophisticated handling of effects related to market concentration and 
the presence of bankrupt carriers should be considered. Another possibility is that low cost 
carriers react to carriers differently than legacy carriers. This hypothesis is only indirectly explored 
here by separating out competitive and concentrated markets. A more explicit control for LCC 
behavior should be considered. The use of structural models instead of a reduced form should 
also be looked at in future efforts.
The current study consists of a partial-equilibrium analysis, which ignores the spending of 
the tax revenues collected. A limitation of this approach is that it disregards the value that airlines 
and passengers receive from the public spending of ticket taxes and fees. In order to avoid this 
limitation, estimating the balanced-budget incidence should be considered in future work.
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Even with the existing model, the level of sophistication and detail can be improved. The 
original data set is extremely rich, with nearly 150 million observations, but it is reduced to at most 
320 observations for any one regression. Possible improvements to the analysis include 
increasing the number of markets, controlling for competition by entering a measurement of 
concentration into the specification, and controlling for the effect of connections in an itinerary. 
These measures are excluded because of computational limitations: Increased resources and 
development of automated techniques would allow to better capitalize on the richness of the 
original data.
Another limitation on the number of observations is the need to inspect all route-pairs for 
close substitutes in the pool of concentrated markets. Avoiding this step would easily allow the 
number of markets to be increased to incorporate the full pool of markets (approximately 750 
markets, or up to 12,000 observations for each episode). There is no reason justified by 
econometrics to limit the pools to twenty routes, or even to have identical numbers of competitive 
and concentrated markets. Since standard errors are inversely proportional to the number of 
observations, any increase in the sample size is likely to improve confidence in the results. With 
the ability of more precisely distinguishing the price impact of the unit tax vs. that of the ad 
valorem tax, a natural extension would be to estimate market power in the airline industry by 
examining the ratio of these two types of tax incidence.
It would also be desirable to introduce information about the fare class into the analysis 
(e.g., restricted leisure fare, unrestricted leisure fare, business class, first class). This information 
is not available in the DBIBMarket sub-table. It is available in the sub-table DBIBCoupon, which 
contains segment specific data. It does not include fare data, and is therefore in and of itself not 
sufficient for the analysis of tax incidence. A relational database could be created by linking the 
origin-destination records of DB1 BMarket to the segment specific records in DB1 BCoupon. This 
would also allow for controlling for differences between round-trip, one-way, and open-jaw 
itineraries. This would, however, be computationally intensive and certain technical challenges 
would need to be overcome. For example, the fare class may change between segments, so that 
any one fare may be associated with multiple fare classes. However, the investment in this
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approach may be worth it, as it has the potential to substantially improve the estimation of tax 
incidence.
The GAO observed what may be asymmetric responses to tax changes: Base fares rose 
when taxes were lowered and rose again when taxes were increased. Limited evidence of 
asymmetric response is also found in this study, for example in the passenger weighted averages 
of fares before, during, and after the tax shocks. This result does not directly follow from the 
theoretical framework presented here, but could be explained by theories which incorporate 
strategizing, fare wars, or other forms of imperfect competition in the industry. No evidence of 
asymmetric tax incidence is found in the regressions conducted for this study, but the evaluation 
of this hypothesis is rudimentary. A more in-depth theoretical exploration of asymmetric price 
response to tax changes combined with a rigorous treatment of this eventuality in the empirical 
specification would be valuable.
In addition to possible model improvements, there is also the potential for practical 
applications of this research. At the time of writing the interest at the national level regarding 
ticket tax issues remains very high. This is due to the 2007 reauthorization of the Airport and 
Airway Trust Fund and to the ongoing labor negotiations between the FAA and its air traffic 
controllers. The majority of controller salaries is funded through federal ticket taxes. It should be 
recalled that the original lapse in federal tax collection authority was caused by a similarly 
contentious debate over the reauthorization of the trust fund. This time, the significance of the 
debate is heightened by the financial struggles of the airline industry.
The FAA has developed a decision support system, the National Airspace System 
Strategy Simulator (NSS), to analyze potential changes in the federal ticket tax structure. NSS is 
a macro level model which allows decision makers to predict the impact of policy changes on 
aviation demand and on federal tax revenues (Ventana Systems, Inc, 2006, p. 1).
Several applied research projects on tax incidence are possible using NSS. There is a 
basic need to verify whether NSS models tax incidence in a manner that is consistent with theory 
and which matches empirical findings. The NSS simulates air travel demand using a constant 
elasticity demand curve with a price elasticity set at -1 (Ventana Systems, Inc., 2006, p. 3). The
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supply side model, on the other hand, is based on a linear supply curve. These simplifying 
assumptions place considerable constraints on the theoretical outcomes of tax incidence. One 
project would be to verify whether the model is internally consistent with its assumptions. A 
second project would be to improve the model to allow for more complex behavior. General 
consistency with empirical findings on the incidence of ticket taxes and fees should also be 
verified. As currently implemented, NSS does not include information on the tax shocks of 
1996-1997 and 2003. These tax changes could be entered into the simulation, to verify that NSS 
reflects historical changes in demand, tax revenue, and tax incidence caused by changes in tax 
rates and levels.
The combination of very rich data sets, scarcity of previously published research, and 
high relevance to the crafting of public policy, makes incidence of ticket taxes a particularly 
appropriate topic for future work. This study provides several initial insights into tax incidence in 
U.S. air transportation. The study also identifies many challenges, both theoretical and practical, 
to be addressed in future research. It is hoped that this study will encourage both additional 
scholarly inquiry and public policy debate on the incidence of ticket taxes and fees, as well as the 
broader question of how to improve the funding system for air transportation infrastructure.
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